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The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth 
Amendment and the Power of Technological 
Surveillance 
Raymond Shih Ray Kut 
[O]urs is a gove=ent of laws, not of men, and ... we submit our-
selves to rulers only if under rules.1 
INTRODUCTION 
A great challenge of constitutional law is to interpret a 
document "intended to endure for ages to come, and, conse-
quently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."2 
With respect to the Fourth Amendment3 since the invention of 
the telephone, judges and scholars have debated over how to 
translate a document originally adopted with the investigative 
tools of the eighteenth century in mind to the current state of 
the art. For over seventy years, the tools government4 may 
employ and how they may be used to combat criminals who 
have adopted "technological advances and used them to further 
their felonious purposes"5 or simply to enforce laws more effi-
ciently, have turned upon the Supreme Court interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment and the scope of interests protected by 
t Associate Professor of Law, Director, Institute of Law, Science & 
Technology, Seton Hall University School of Law. I am indebted to Susan 
Bandes, Erik Lillquist, Christopher Slobogin, Daniel Solove, and Charles Sul-
livan for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article, to the editors of the 
Minnesota Law Review for their assistance and for inviting me to participate 
in this symposium, and to Oded Weinstock for his capable research assistance. 
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
2. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause .... "). 
4. Throughout this Article, the terms government, executive, and law 
enforcement are used interchangeably unless otherwise noted. 
5. United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 583 (D.N.J. 2001). 
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it. Today, the nine justices of the Supreme Court unanimously 
agree that privacy is the principal interest protected by the 
amendment. They are wrong. 
The Fourth Amendment protects power not privacy. This 
is not to say that the Fourth Amendment has nothing to do 
with privacy-the amendment clearly addresses privacy, or 
more precisely, the right of the people to be secure. Rather, the 
amendment is best understood as a means of preserving the 
people's authority over government-the people's sovereign 
right to determine how and when govemment may intrude into 
the lives and influence the behavior of its citizens.6 The 
amendment does so as part of the rich tapestry that is the Con-
stitution, and cannot be viewed in isolation, but must at the 
very least be viewed together with the principles embodied in 
the constitutional separation of powers. To paraphrase Justice 
Jackson, the Fourth Amendment protects more than privacy; it 
ensures that governmental invasions of individual privacy aTe 
based upon rules established by the people, rules our rulers 
must follow in order to engage in surveillance. 7 Current Fourth 
.A_mendment doctrine not only ignores this principle-lost as it 
is in the effort to define reasonable expectations of privacy8-it 
subverts it. By limiting the Fourth ..A..mendment's application to 
instances in whicl1 government in··vades a reasonable expecta~ 
tion of privacy as defined by the courts, the Supreme Court has 
shifted the authority for determining the scope of government's 
investigative power from the people to judges and law enforce-
ment. 
This power shift is accomplished by the way in which the 
6. !n this respect, the Fourth An1endment's concern for privacy is !lO ilif-
ferent than its concern for law enforcement's use of force, coercion, or other 
methods of investigation. To the extent that Fourth Amendment law has be-
come myopically focused on defining privacy as secrecy, I agree with William 
Stuntz that the focus is problematic. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem 
and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1016-17 (1995). 
As Susan Bandes observes, the problems presented by the Supreme Court's 
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence extend well beyond new technolo-
gies. Susan Bandes, Power, Privacy and Thermal Imaging, 86 MINN. L. REV. 
1379 (2002). While this Article addresses the Supreme Court's treatment of 
surveillance teclmologies, the criticisms and suggestions raised by it are 
applicable to all law enforcement decisions that determine the scope of 
executive power, including what investigative techniques are permissible, to 
what weapons may be used to combat crime. A detailed discussion of all of 
these issues, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
7. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
8. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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Court.frames the Fourth Amendment inquiry. In determining 
whether the Fourth Amendment applies, the Supreme Court 
asks whether the governmental activity is considered a search 
under the Constitution. 9 For the most part, this inquiry loosely 
examines whether the government act is equivalent to the 
types of searches our nation's Founders considered problem-
atic.10 If the activity is considered equivalent then it is treated 
as a search, and according to the Court, the Constitution limits 
governmental power by imposing the requirement of a warrant 
supported by probable cause. 11 If the activity is not equivalent, 
then government agents have unfettered discretion to engage 
in the activity in question with no Fourth Amendment over-
sight or restraint. With respect to. emerging technologies like 
the FBI's Magic Lantern project, 12 the decryption of encrypted 
messages,B or Carnivore, 14 this approach leaves open the pos-
sibility that, despite the information gathering capabilities of 
these technologies, their use may not be regulated at all under 
the Constitution because semantically, the Court may not con-
sider their use searches.l5 As others have noted, "[t]his ap-
proach fails to protect privacy rights, and permits their gradual 
decay with each improved technological advance."16 
Moreover, in engaging in this semantic game, the Supreme 
Court's current Fourth P..mendment doctrine allows govern-
ment to determine for itselfthe scope of its own powers. This is 
accomplished by assuming that law enforcement has the inher-
9. See infra Part II. For the seminal discussion of Fourth Amendment 
law after Katz, see Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974). 
10. See infra Part II. 
11. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
12. Magic Lantem is an FBI project designed to implant recording soft-
ware into computers through the Internet using the same techniques and vul-
nerabilities exploited by hackers. See infra Part II.A.l. 
13. Encryption is the process of converting a file into an unreadable form 
for the purpose of protecting the confidentiality of the content. Decryption is 
the process of translating the encrypted message into a comprehendible for-
mat. See infra Part IIA.2. 
14. Carnivore is a govemment device programmed to capture information 
being delivered by an Intemet service provider. See infra Part II.A.3. 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of 
the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 
39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 650 (1988); see also David E. Steinberg, Making 
Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV. 563 (1990) (criticizing 
the incoherence of the Supreme Court's sense-enhanced search cases and sug-
gesting three factors that may better protect Fourth Amendment privacy). 
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ent power to adopt and utilize new technologies subject only to 
narrow Fourth Amendment protections for privacy,I7 and 
unless a search invades a recognizable privacy interest,. the 
amendment places no limits upon government's ability to con-
duct that search. In many instances this means that law en-
forcement, including individual officers, is not bound by any le-
gal or constitutional restraints in deciding what surveillance 
devices to use, as well as when and how to use them. In the 
abstract, allowing the government to obtain a suspect's secret 
password, to decipher encoded messages, or to monitor e-mail 
traffic may not trouble the casual observer. After all, these 
tools may not only make govemment's job easier; in some in-
stances they may be essential to combat technologically sophis-
ticated criminals. When interpreting the Constitution, how-
ever, the judicial function is not to balance the relative value or 
efficacy of such tools against the corresponding loss of privacy 
and cost to society, but to determine whether the people have 
made such a decision either in the Constitution itself or by con-
ferring upon their representatives the decisionmaking author-
ity to conduct such a balancing. By leaving the decision to 
adopt nevv slli·-veillance technologies largely to the discretion Qf 
law enforcement, the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence 
largely stands the amendment on its head. 
Current doctrine also raises grave concerns about the fun-
damental relationship between the amendment and the Consti-
tution's separation of powers. As the Supreme Court made 
clear in its landmark decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, the executive branch of government does not make 
the law or determine the scope of its power, but rather enforces 
the laws with the powers and means delegated to it by the Con-
stitution or by statute.l8 By removing entire categories of 
searches from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, the Court eviscer-
ates what is often the only limitation upon law enforcement 
17. As I have discussed elsewhere, in a constitutional regime based upon 
the principles of popular sovereignty, assuming that government has a par-
ticular power in the process of determining whether the constitution then pro-
vides certain exceptions to those powers is a serious problem in constitutional 
interpretation, and is quite apparent in modern substantive due process 
analysis. See generally Raymond Ku, Swingers: Morality Legislation and the 
Limits of State Police Power, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing that the 
way in which the substantive due process inquiry is framed incorrectly as-
sumes that the power to regulate morality qua morality has been entrusted to 
government by the sovereign people). 
18. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952). 
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power. The absence of Fourth Amendment safeguards raises 
senous separation of powers concerns given that executive 
branch decisions to adopt and implement new surveillance 
technologies are often made without express legislative or con-
stitutional authorization. 19 For the purposes of this discussion, 
this Article assumes that the presence of Fourth Amendment 
safeguards at least mitigates these concerns by placing consti-
tutional limits upon government use of such technologies even 
in the absence of legislative or constitutional authorization. 
This assumption cannot be made, however, in the absence of 
Fourth Amendment protection. 
All, however, is not lost. The Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Kyllo v. United States20 may be a step in the right direc-
tion out of a jurisprudence mired in defining privacy. In decid-
ing that the government's use of thennal imaging equipment 
without a warrant was unlawful, Justice Scalia concludes that 
when a technology is "not in general public use," the Court 
should "assureD preservation of that degree of privacy against 
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted."21 In other words, instead of asking whetl;ter the 
Founders would have considered the act in question a search, 
the Court should ask whether the Founders enjoyed this level 
of security from government surveillance and harassment. By 
grounding the analysis in the privacy enjoyed by the Founders, 
Kyllo has the potential to return the Fourth Amendment to its 
proper role, not because its definition of privacy is superior, but 
because it would subject all searches assisted by new technolo-
gies to the amendment's restraints. Taken to its logical conclu-
sion; Kyllo suggests that government use of new technologies 
should always be subject to the warrant requirement unless 
they are in general public use. Consequently, law enforcement 
would need probable cause and a warrant before it could use 
technologies like Magic Lantern, decryption, or Carnivore.22 
If the Supreme Court follows this interpretation of Kyllo, it 
would be a significant step toward reconciling the Fourth 
19. My suggestion that the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted as 
part of the doctrine of separation of powers is similar to John Hart Ely's ar-
gument that the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted as part of the con-
stitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. See JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 96-97, 172-73 
(1980). 
20. 533 U.S. 27, (2001). 
21. Id. at 34. 
22. See infra Part II.A. 
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Amendment with the doctrine of separation of powers, and re-
tuming the decision-making authority over the· appropriate 
level of privacy and security in our society to "the people."23 
This is true in two respects. First, to the extent that the Su-
preme Court continues to pay lip service to its holding that a 
warrant is required for every search or seizure to be considered 
reasonable,24 Kyllo keeps the already significant number of ex-
ceptions from growing even further and swallowing the rule. 
The "people's will" is then obeyed by adherence to their will as 
expressed in the Warrant Clause. ·Central to this interpreta-
tion is the elimination of Kyllo's "general public use" exception 
or defining the exception narrowly to ensure only the public· as 
a whole adequately appreciates the threat of such technology 
and that subsequent governmental decisions to trade off pri-
vacy for effective law enforcement are made considering every-
one's interests equally. 25 · · 
Second, to the extent that this approach raises concems 
that the Fourth Amendment does not require a per se warrant 
rule, and the Court is asked to expand its interpretation of rea-
sonableness, which I described as the· radical thesis, reason-
ableness should only include USeS of SUrveillance techil.Ologies 
authorized by statute. In turn these statutes should be subject 
to judicial review to determine whether they include constitu-
tionally adequate safeguards that substitute for a warrant. 
This approach would provide at least some assurance that the 
people rather than some of their least accountable agents de-
termine the appropriate level of privacy and security in society 
and requires the Court to take seriously its representation-
reinforcing role. Under this interpretation, the Fourth 
Amendment would permit only those uses of surveillance tech-
nologies that the people as a whole have deemed appropriate 
based upon the Warrant Clause, or those uses for which the 
people's politically accountable representatives have balanced, 
ex ante, the various privacy interests with the needs of law en-
forcement. 
It should be apparent that this Article does not attempt to 
answer the riddle of when any particular search assisted by 
technology should be considered reasonable under the Fourth 
23. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
24. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,357 (1967). 
25. See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth 
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 94-95 (1988). 
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. Amendment, which I describe as a micro-level inquiry.26 
Rather, this Article contends that we must engage in a macro-
level inquiry asking the antecedent question-whether gov-
ernment has the power to use a particular technology to assist 
surveillance at all. No one questions whether law enforcement 
may use eyes, ears, hands, and minds to combat crime. Nor do 
we generally question that government should have the power 
to pull over vehicles that violate traffic laws, stop suspects on 
public streets, or break open doors. These are the tools of the 
physical world, and law enforcement could not function without 
them. With respect to these searches, the Fourth Amendment 
requires courts to determine whether government's focus and 
treatment of a particular subject was justified given the cir-
cumstances_27 The use of emerging technologies for gathering 
information, however, is an altogether different inquiry. Cases 
evaluating the use of surveillance technologies determine the 
substantive level of privacy and security of society in general, 
not simply whether the govemment's investigation of a particu-
lar individual was reasonable. From Camivore to thermal im-
.agi;ng,28 the decision to allow law enforcement to use emerging 
surveillance technologies is effectively a decision to expand 
govemment power at the expense of the public's privacy and 
security. In a constitutional democracy based upon the princi-
ple of popular sovereignty, we may legitimately question the 
source of such power. 
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the history and ori-
gins ofthe Fourth Amendment and its relationship to the doc-
trine of separation of powers. Part I argues that the central 
purpose of the amendment was not to define various aspects of 
life as private, but to guarantee that the people .defined the lim-
its of the executive's surveillance power. Part II then examines 
the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence dealing 
26. For an excellent discussion of the problems raised by Kyllo with re-
spect to micro-level decisions see Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms 
and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Governing Techno-
logical Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393 (2002). 
27. See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 553 (1992) ("In the typical Fourth 
Amendment case, a police officer has searched an individual or his belongings 
for evidence of crime. The law governing such searches is a good deal like neg-
ligence doctrine: the reasonableness of the government's action is a function of 
the probable gain from the intrusion weighed against the likely loss to the in-
dividual .... "). 
28. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1461, 1475-1500 (2000) (describing various surveillance technologies). 
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with teclli1olog-y prior to Kyllo, and the problems associated 
with this jurisprudence. Part H argues that the Supreme 
Court's framing of the p-rivacy question as whether a new 
search is equivalent to the searches the Founders feared not 
only fails to provide law enforcement with any guidance, but 
supplants the decisionmaking authority of the people in part by 
failing to distinguish between macro-level decisions and micro-
level decisions. In this discussion, Part II uses as examples 
three emerging investigative technologies: Magic Lantern, de-
cryption, and Carnivore. In Part III, this Article discusses the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Kyllo and how it might sug-
gest an alternative Fourth Amendment analysis based upon 
the Founders' privacy. This analysis is then applied to the 
three examples discussed in Part 'II. Part IV argues that unlike 
the Supreme Court's current approach, an analysis based upon 
the Founders' privacy may be consistent with the ·principles of 
constitutional self-governance and reconcile the current tension 
between the Fourth Amendment and the constitutional doc-
trine of separation of powers. Part IV.A discusses the moderate 
thesis, and Part IV.B the radic~ 1 thesis. 
I. RESPONDING TO UNBRIDLED DISCRETION AND 
POWER 
To place the difficulties with the Supreme Court's current 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in context, a summary 
of the amendment's history and origins is necessary. 29 A brief 
review of the historical foundations of the amendment reveals 
that, while privacy in terms of the sanctity of home and papers 
was a concern prior to the amendment's adoption, the overarch-
i11g concern ,1\,as unfettered governmental povver a11d discretio11, 
and that "the people" played a prominent role in defining the 
scope of government power and limiting its exercise.30 In light 
of this pre-constitutional history, the Fourth Amendment can 
be appreciated for what it is-an outgrowth and complement to 
the limitations placed upon executive power through the Con-
29. For more detailed discussions of the Amendment's history and origins 
see, for example, AliT·IIL REED AlviAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION (1998); JACOB W. LANDYNSEJ, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND 
THE SUPREME COURT (1966); NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION (1937); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal 
Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393 (1995). 
30. See supra note 29. 
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stitution's separation ofpowers. 
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE FOUNDERS' CONCERNS 
According to conventional wisdom, the Fourth Amendment 
embodies the Founders' concerns over general warrants and 
writs of assistance as illustrated by three pre-constitutional 
search and seizure cases:31 Wilkes v. Wood,32 Entick v. Carring-
ton,33 and the Writs of Assistance Case.34 These decisions are 
important because of two connecting themes: concern about the 
privacy of an individual's home and papers against the gov-
ernment and fear of unbridled official power and discretion. 35 
For example, the Wilkes case arose in response to efforts to 
punish John Wilkes, a well-known member of Parliament, for 
seditious libel as the author of a series of anonymously pub-
lished pamphlets called The North Briton, including a pam-
phlet, Number 45, critical of King George III.36 Lord Halifax, 
the British Secretary of State, issued a warrant that did not 
name Wilkes or any other individual by name, but instead, di-
rected officials "to make strict and diligent search for the au-
thors, printers and publishers of a seditious and treasonable 
paper" and "to apprehend and seize, together with their pa-
pers."37 The officials carrying out the warrant arrested Wilkes 
and forty-nine other suspects by breaking into their homes and 
seizing their personal papers.38 
31. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) (noting 
that the "wellknown historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment" was "di-
rected against general warrants and writs of assistance"). While there is some 
debate over the relative importance of the writs of assistance, compare AMAR, 
supra note 29, at 66 n.* (arguing that the writ of assistance case played ''very 
little role in the discussions leading up to the Fourth Amendment") with Tracy 
Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 197, 223-28 (1993) (arguing that the disputes over writs of assistance 
played an important role in colonial understanding of unreasonable searches 
and seizures). Because my argument does not depend upon the proper resolu-
tion of this debate, I will include the Writs of Assistance Case in this discus-
sion. See Stuntz, supra note 29, at 396 n.9 (treating the Writs of Assistance 
Case as part of the Fourth Amendment canon despite this debate). 
32. 19 Howell's State Trials 1153 (K.B. 1763). 
33. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (K.B. 1765). 
34. See M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF AsSISTANCE CASE (1978). 
35. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 399-400, 406-08 (identifying the two themes 
connecting these cases as privacy and unbridled official discretion). 
36. Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1159-61. 
37. The Case of John Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials 982, 982 (K.B. 
1763). 
38. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 399. 
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In response, Wilkes and several of the other suspects chal-
lenged their arrest by bringing trespass actions against the of-
ficials involved. In Wilkes v. Wood, Chief Justice Pratt in-
structed the jury that 
[t]he defendants claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons' 
houses, break opon escrutores, seize their papers, ... upon a general 
warrant ... , and therefore a discretionary power given to messengers 
to search wherever .their suspicions may chance to fall. If such a 
power is truly invested in a secretary of state, and he can delegate 
this power, it certainly may affect the person and property of every 
man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the 
subject.39 
The jury found for Wilkes, awarding him one thousand pounds 
in damage,40 and in a separ~te suit against Lord Halifax, 
Wilkes was awarded an additional four thousand pounds.41 As 
Wiliiam Stuntz notes, the cases arising out of. these arrests 
"stand for the proposition that [general] warrants are inva-
lid ... and that arrests must be grounded in some cause to sus-
pect the arrestee personally of a crime."42 To the extent that 
the Wilkes decision influenced the Founders, it suggests that 
the Fou..rth Amendment was adopted as ·a means of restraining 
official discretion. As the Chief Justice emphasized in his jury 
instruction, the question raised by the case is whether anyone 
in government has the power to search "wherever their suspi-
cions may chance fall."43 · 
The concern over official discretion was similarly echoed 
with respect to writs of assistance. In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, British statutes gave customs officials 
virtually unlimited authority to search for and seize goods in 
violation of existing trade rules.44 These writs of assistance did 
not grant the authority to search; "rather, they enabled cus-
toms officers to compel others--constables, local officials; or 
39. Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1167. 
40. Id. at 1168. 
41. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 399. 
42. Id. at 400; see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (not-
ing that the prohibition of general warrants was one ofthe central purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-85 (1980) 
(stating a similar proposition). 
43. Wilkes, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1167. 
44. For example, the Act of Frauds of 1662 authorized customs officers "to 
enter, and go into any House, Shop, Cellar, Warehouse or Room, or other 
Place, and in Case of Resistance, to break open Doors, Chests, Trunks and 
other Package, there to seize, and from thence to bring, any Kind of Goods or 
Merchandize whatsoever, prohibited and uncustomed." Act of Frauds § 5(2) 
(1662), reprinted in SMITH, supra note 34, at 25 (emphasis omitted). 
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even private citizens~to assist in carrying out the necessary 
searches and seizures."45 Nonetheless, as Stuntz notes, be-
cause they permitted searches based only upon the suspicion of 
the customs officer, "the writs became wrapped up with the 
search authority they sought to confirm."46 As another com-
mentator observes, much like the general warrant, "[t]he odi-
ous features of writs of assistance were the unbridled discretion 
given public officials to choose targets of the searches," and "the 
arbitrary invasion of homes and offices to execute the writs."47 
This concern over discretion was clearly a central argu-
ment in James Otis's argument against the writs. According to 
Otis, 
A man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is as well 
guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared 
legal, would totally annihilate this privilege. Custom house officers 
may enter our houses when they please-we are commanded to per-
mit their entry-their menial servants may enter-may break locks, 
bars and every thing in their way-and whether they break through 
malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire-bare suspicion 
without oath is sufficient.48 
Even though Otis's argument lost, John Adams later described 
his argument as "the first Act of Opposition to the arbitrary 
Claims of Great Britain."49 While Otis rhetorically invokes the 
right of privacy with his reference to the sanctity of the home, 
this right is clearly not absolute. The home is considered a cas-
tle only so long as the individual is "quiet" in it. This conces-
sion is quite appropriate and reasonable. Aside from question-
ing the validity of the underlying substantive crime, it is 
difficult to imagine any value that would justify an absolute 
right to hide evidence of a crime. 50 Accordingly, the problem 
with the writs was not the invasion of the castle, which is how 
privacy is commonly conceived, but with the process justifying 
45. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 405. 
46. Id. 
47. Shirley M. Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Intangible Things: 
Regulation of Government Information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 
1487 (1979). 
48. James Otis, Address, reprinted in SMITH, supra note 34, at 344. Put 
another way, the writs place "the liberty of man in the hands of every petty 
officer." Id. at 331. 
49. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 107 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. 
Zobel eds., 1965) (letter to William Tudor (March 29, 1817). 
50. As Professor Stuntz has argued, Wilkes and Entick were essentially 
First Amendment cases in a regime in which there was not opportunity for di-
rect substantive review. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 403. 
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the invasion. The writs gave customs officers and their "menial 
servants" the right to enter any home whenever they pleased. 
The "liberty" Otis so eloquently argued for was not an absolute 
right of privacy, however defined. Instead, his liberty is the 
liberty recognized in Wilkes, freedom from arbitrary and unfet-
tered government power. 
The relative importance of limiting governmental power 
and discretion versus defining what is private is apparent when 
one considers that only one of the cases in the triumvirate 
turned on an absolute right to keep information from the gov-
ernment. Like Wilkes, John Entick authored a series of pam-
phlets that authorities considered libelous.S1 Once again, Lord 
Halifax issued a warrant authorizing the Crown's agents to 
seize Entick and his papers. 52 Unlike Wilkes, this was not a 
general warrant because Entick was specifically named. None-
theless, Entick sued in trespass and was awarded three hun-
dred pounds. 53 In upholding the jury's verdict, Pratt, now Lord 
Camden, concluded that "[p]apers are the owner's goods and 
chattels: they are his dearest property; and are so far from en-
during a seizure, that they will hardly' bear an inspection."54 
Despite the fact that the government h:id obtained a valid war-
rant, the court concluded that searching and seizing of papers 
themselves was impermissible. This conclusion was to be ech-
oed in American constitutional law in Boyd v. United States,55 
in which the Supreme Court· held that one's papers are pro-
tected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 56 
While the decision in Entick clearly recognizes the private 
nature of papers, most of Pratt's decision is spent questioning 
the authority and process by which the warrant was issued. In 
affirming the trespass verdict, Entick rejected the power and 
authority of the Secretary to issue a lawful warrant as well as 
the lawfulness of the process by which the warrant was issued 
and executed. 57 Criticizing the power of the Secretary of State 
as "pretty singular,"58 he rejected the idea that the Secretary of 
State had the power to issue warrants that could not be chal-
51. En tick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1031 (K.B. 1765). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 1036. 
54. Id. at 1066. 
55. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
56. Id. at 634-35. 
57. Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1045. 
58. Id. 
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lenged and reviewed by the judiciary,59 or immunize its issuer 
and agents from subsequent prosecution.6° According to Pratt, 
the laws of England did not grant the Secretary such power.61 
Instead, the Secretary's claim "stands upon a very poor founda-
tion, being in truth no more than a conjecture of law without 
authority to support it."62 Similarly, Pratt considered the war-
rant unlawful because, even assuming that it was supported by 
oath, it was executed ex parte, without notice or a chance to be 
heard, upon unknown information and informants, and its exe-
cution did not have to occur in the presence of a constable or 
the party.63 These procedures were especially troubling be-
cause, if such a warrant were issued and executed against an 
innocent party, 
he is as destitute of remedy as the guilty: and the whole transaction is 
so guarded against discovery, that if the officer should be disposed to 
carry off a bank-bill, he may do it with impunity, since there is no 
man capable of proving either the taker or the thing taken. 64 
Fear of government power and discretion, therefore, runs 
through even the most privacy-centric decision. 
It should be apparent from the Founder's concerns over 
general warrants and writs of assistance that a primary goal of 
the Fourth Amendment is the same as that of the entire Con-
stitution-to define and limit governmental power. While the 
sanctity of one's home and papers, 65 as well as public disagree-
ment with the substantive offenses,66 clearly played an impor-
tant role in these early cases, fear of unfettered governmental 
power resonates even more clearly. Moreover, to the extent the 
house and papers are to be protected, the text of the amend-
59. See id. at 1045-59. 
60. See id. at 1059-62. 
61. See id. at 1057 ("The whole body of the law, if I may use the phrase, 
were as ignorant at that time of a privy counsellor's right to commit in the 
case of a libel, as the whole body of privy counselors are at this day."). 
62. Id. at 1053. 
63. Id. at 1064-66. 
64. Id. at 1065. 
65. For example, in the Writs of Assistance Case, James Otis argued that 
"[a] man's house is his castle." James Otis, Address, reprinted in SMITH, supra 
note 34, at 344. In Entick, Pratt argued that "[p]apers are the owner's goods 
and chattels: they are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a sei-
zure, that they will hardly bear an inspection." Entick, 19 Howell's State Tri-
als at 1066. 
66. See Stuntz, supra note 29, at 406-07 (arguing that the response to 
these decisions can be explained by public opposition to the underlying 
charges and offenses). 
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ment and its history suggest that the protection flows from re-
straining governmental discretion even when that discretion is 
specifically granted by statute. As Akhil Reed Amar suggests, 
the Fourth Amendment, therefore, is concerned with the 
agency problem, that is "protecting the people generally from 
self-interested government."67 The amendment affords this pro-
tection not by defining what is private, but by expressly limit-
ing government's power to- conduct searches. Accordingly, 
searches must be reasonable, and warrants may only issue 
when supported by probable cause.68 
For the purpose of this discussion, this history is also im-
portant because of what it suggests about how government dis-
cretion and power might be limited. While the Fourth Amend-
ment speaks of the reasonableness of searches and the issuing 
of warrants except upon probable cause in the disjunctive, the 
Supreme Court has collapsed the two requirements, creating a 
general rule that warrantless searches are per se unreason-
able.69 As Part H discusses, under this approach, the Supreme 
Comt has made itself the principal arbiter of which govern-
rnent acts are or are not reasonable. This interpretation of the 
amendment is certainly not compelled by its history and ori-
gins.70 Instead, the Founders believed that "the people" and 
not judges were to "protect both individual persons and the col-
lective people against a possibly "Lmrepresentative and self-
serving officialdom."71 
The people exercised considerable power in these pre-
constitutional cases because juries, not judges, determined the 
reasonableness of a search. As evidenced by Wilkes and Entick, 
the people would have an opportunity to evaluate searches in a 
common.-hw action for trespass. As such, "a jury, guided by a 
judge in a public trial and able to hear arguments from both 
sides of the case, could typically assess the reasonableness of 
government action in an afte:r-the-fact tort suit."72 As Amar 
67. AMAR, supra note 29, at 67-68. 
68. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
69. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 
(1972) (noting that "the definition of'reasonableness' turns, at least in part, on 
the more specific commands of the Warrant Clause"); Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); AMAR, supra note 29, at 68 (noting that "[t]he mod-
ern Supreme Court has intentionally collapsed the two requirements"); 
Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 358. 
70. See AMAR, supra note 29, at 64-77. 
71. Id. at 68. 
72. Id. at 70. 
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has argued in light of this background, it is not hard to imagine 
that "the people" were to play a similar role in restraining gov-
ernmental power under the Fourth Amendment.73 Large civil 
verdicts against the government agents conducting a search 
would deter similar behavior in the future. Moreover, once a 
jury concludes that the search is unreasonable, the search 
would be considered unlawful by defmition under the Fourth 
Amendment.74 
Under this regime, warrants were undesirable "pro-
government" tools.75 A lawful warrant effectively immunized 
the government agent from 1iability,76 and removed the legality 
of the search from the decisionmaking authority of the civil 
jury.77 Warrants, therefore, were generally disfavored and 
viewed with hostility, which explains why the Fourth Amend-
ment circumscribes rather than encourages their use.78 As 
Stuntz argues, this hostility stems from the fact that warrants 
"transferred the issue of the legality of the search from the 
jury ... to a judge or executive official ... , acting both ex parte 
and ex ante." 79 Hostility to warrants represented hostility to 
this shift in power.80 As A.tuaJ.' documents in The Bill of Rights, 
throughout the ratifYing debates, the Founders expressed their 
belief that this power was best entrusted in the people as rep-
resented by the institution of the jury rather than the judici-
ary.B1 As one essay at the time argued, if an officer searching 
73. Id. ("We can now s'ee the Fourth Amendment with new eyes."). 
74. I d. ("If the properly instructed jury deemed the search unreasonable, 
the plain words of the Fourth Amendment would render the search unlaw-
ful"). 
75. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 410 ("Warrants were a pro-govemment tool, 
not a protection for the citizenry."). 
76. AMAR, supra note 29, at 69 ("Any lawful warrant, in effect, would com-
pel a sort of directed verdict for the defendant govemment official in any 
subsequent lawsuit for damages."); Stuntz, supra note 29, at 409-10 ("A war-
rant provided an effective defense against a trespass claim because it estab-
lished the legality of the search, creating a kind oflegal 'safe harbor."'). 
77. AMAR, supra note 29, at 69; Stuntz, supra note 29, at 410. 
78. See TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 41 (1969) (''Far from looking at the warrant as a protection 
against unreasonable searches, they saw it as an authority for unreasonable 
and oppressive searches, and sought to confine its issuance and execution in 
line with the stringent requirements applicable to co=on-law warrants for 
stolen goods .... "). 
79. Stuntz, supra note 29, at 410. 
80. Id. 
81. AMAR, supra note 29, at 74. As Professor Amar further notes, this 
also meant that state law would play a significant role in protecting individual 
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for stolen goods, pulled down the clothes of a bed in which there was a 
woman, and searched under her shift ... a trial by jury would be our 
safest resource, heavy damage would at once punish the offender, and 
deter others from committing the same: but what satisfaction can we 
expect from a lordly (judge] always ·ready to protect the officers of 
govemment against the weak and helpless citizen ... ?82 
By limiting lawful warrants to only those based upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, the Fourth Amendment 
protects the people's power to determine the lawfulness of a 
search.83 By emphasizing the importance of the jury at com-
mon law, 1 do not intend to suggest that the jury is the only ap-
propriate body for determining the reasonableness of a search, 
or even for a greater role for the jury today. 84 Judges can and 
must continue to play an impor~ant role in interpreting the 
Fourth Amendment. Rather, this discussion illustrates the im-
portance the Founders placed on having such decisions en-
trusted to a popular body rather than government officials 
alone. 
B. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
011e of. tl1e most perplexing problems of a go~;ernn1er1t of 
laws and not of men is ensuring that the power wielded by the 
executive branch of government, "whether wielded by a Prince 
or a President, is itself governed by and answeTable to the 
law."85 Under American constitutional law, this is accom-
plished by requiring, at least in the domestic sphere, that ex-
ecutive power be governed either by the Constitution or by 
statute. As Laurence Tribe notes, the rejection of an all en-
compassing inherent executive power is dictated by the princi-
ples of popular sovereignty under constitutions that vest pri-
mary responsibility for regulating domestic activities in the 
legislative branch of government. 86 The executive's domestic 
liberties. I d. at 76. 
82. I d. at 7 4 (quoting Essay of a Democratic Federalist, reprinted in 3 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 61 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)). 
83. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
84. This nation and the U.S. Constitution have undergone significant 
changes since the eighteenth century including the rise of the professional po-
lice force, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fact that we are 
a much larger and more heterogeneous community weakening the common 
law jury as a safeguard. 
85. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 4-1, at 630 
(3d ed. 2000). 
86. Jd. § 4-2, at 636 ("The federal regulation of domestic affairs has its 
constitutional origins in the people and the states, and its initiation is allo-
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role under the Constitution is best illustrated by the Supreme 
Court's landmark decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube. 87 
In 1951, a labor dispute between steel companies and their 
employees threatened steel production during the Korean War. 
Believing that a work stoppage would jeopardize the war effort, 
President Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to take 
possession of and run the steel mills. The steel companies ar-
gued that the President's order violated the Constitution be-
cause it was not authorized by an act of Congress or any consti-
tutional provision. In response, the President argued, inter 
alia, that he had the inherent power to issue such an order or 
at the very least that it was part of his power to "take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed."88 Writing for the Court, Jus-
tice Black agreed with the steel companies and held that the 
"President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem either 
from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."89 With 
respect to the President's argument that the order was consis-
tent with his power to execute the laws, Black responded that 
"[i]n the framework of our Constitution, the President's power 
to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that 
he is to be a lawmaker."9° Instead, the Constitution limits his 
role to directing that "a congressional policy be executed in a 
manner prescribed by Congress," and the Constitution does not 
permit him to direct that "a presidential policy be executed in a 
manner prescribed by the President."91 Because Congress did 
not authorize the President's actions, a majority of the Justices 
concluded that Truman's order was unconstitutional.92 
In his now famous concurring opinion, Justice Jackson ar-
gued that the President claimed a power that "either has no 
beginning or it has no end. If it exists, it need submit to no le-
cated primarily to Congress. The limitation of congressional authority, and 
the direct electoral responsibility of Congress to the people provides some as-
surance to the social institutions that created the Constitution that they would 
not be devoured by it."). 
87. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
88. !d. at 584, 587 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, §3). 
89. Id. at 585. 
90. Id. at 587. 
91. Id. at 588. 
92. In fact, when it enacted the labor laws the President claimed to be en-
forcing, Congress had specifically considered and rejected the idea of giving 
the President the power to seize striking facilities. See id. at 656-58 (Burton, 
J., concurring). 
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gal restraint."93 Recognition of such a power, he argued, would 
be a step toward dictatorship, and was precisely what the 
Founders hoped to avoid by limiting the President's legislative 
power to recommendation and veto.94 According to Jackson, 
"[w]ith all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have dis-
covered no technique for long preserving free government ex-
cept that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be 
made by parliamentary deliberations."95 
Similarly, quoting Brandeis, Justice Douglas argued, 
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Conven-
tion of 1787, not'to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of 
arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by 
means of the inevitable friction incident to Lhe distribution of the gov-
ernmental powers among three departments, to save the people from 
autocracy.96 
Thus, the doctrine of separation of powers protects against ar-
bitrary and unfettered executive power by requiring executive 
decisions to be governed by either constitutional or statutory 
law. 
It should be apparent that the Fourth Amendment and the 
doctrine of separation of powers share the same goal and arc 
intended to serve the same function. As a complement to the 
doctrine of separation of powers, the Fourth Amendment may 
play one of t-vvo roles. Either the amendment establishes the 
minimum requirements that must be satisfied before govern-
ment may conduct a search when those searches are authorized 
by statute, or it guarantees that searches are always regulated 
by the Constitution even if they are not specifically authorized 
by statute. Determining which of these roles is required by the 
Constitution is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, the 
remainder of the discussion assumes fm the sake of argument 
that the latter position accurately describes the relationship be-
tween the Fourth Amendment and the doctrine of separation of 
powers. 
This brief discussion of the Fourth Amendment's history 
and its relationship to the Constitution's separation of powers 
highlights two important principles. First, the Fourth 
Amendment was not intended as a vehicle to define privacy; 
93. Id. at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
94. Id. at 653, 655. 
95. Id. at 655. 
96. I d. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52, 293 (1926)). 
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rather, like the rest of the Constitution in general and the doc-
trine of separation of powers in particular, it is intended to 
limit executive power and discretion. Second, the only legiti-
mate authority for determining the reasonableness of any exer-
cise of govemmental power is the people themselves or their 
legislative representatives. As Part II demonstrates, the Su-
preme Court either has ignored or subverted these principles 
when evaluating the lawfulness of technologically assisted sur-
veillance. 
II. SEARCHES THE FOUNDERS FEARED 
A. TECHNOLOGY AND THE EROSION OF PRIVACY 
The modern Supreme Court has responded to the chal-
lenges posed by new surveillance technologies by adopting an 
analytical framework that asks whether the technologically as-
sisted search is similar to the searches the Founders feared. As 
Anthony Amsterdam described years ago, this approach 
proceeds from the premise that the Fourth Amendment is addressed 
essentially to the forcible rummagings of the English messengers and 
colonial customs officers. It concedes that the amendment extends to 
similar cases, identifies the relevant attributes of similarity, and .ends 
by asking whether the police practice now in issue is sufficiently simi-
lar to the messengers' and customs officers' rummagings in the rele-
vant regards.97 
As such, the Court's approach focuses on the means employed 
by govemment, and has been described by Melvin Gutterman 
as the "means model"98 or what I choose to call "means analy-
sis." The Court's means analysis is problematic for two rea-
sons. First, focusing on the searches the Founders feared does 
97. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 363. 
98. Gutterman, supra note 16, at 650 ("Presently, the Court measures the 
existence of Fourth Amendment privacy solely by reference to the 'means 
model."'). In contrast, at times the Court and its various justices have based 
their analysis on protecting the values embodied in the Fourth Amendment 
regardless of the means employed. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616 (1886); see also Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 364 ("The second approach 
begins by asking what concerns and judgments are implied in the decision to 
establish a constitutional restriction upon a category of official activity generi-
cally described as 'searches and seizures' .... It then inquires whether the po-
lice practice now in issue falls within the ambit of those concerns and judg-
ments."); Gutterman, supra note 16, at 649 (describing a value model as one in 
which the Court focuses on the invasion of privacy and security and not the 
method for the invasion). 
1344 lvlllVNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.86:1325 
little to limit government discretion or to protect individual 
privacy and security. Instead, means analysis allows technol-
ogy to drive the inquiry and erode those liberties. Second, 
means analysis impermissibly shifts the decisionmalcing power 
for defining privacy and determining the appropriate level of 
security in society from the people to law enforcement and the 
judiciary. 
From the beginning, the Supreme Court has taken a nar-
row view of the Fourth Amendment's role in limiting govern-
ment discretion to employ novel technologies. In Olmstead v. 
United States, the Supreme Court concluded that the tappirig of 
a telephone line without a ·warrant did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.99 Federal agents, .investigating Olmstead for 
bootlegging, tapped his home and office telephones, recording 
several months' worth of conve:rsations. 100 In determining 
whether the Fourth Amendment had been violated, the Court 
focused on the means employed by government and what those 
means revealed. 101 In so doing, the Court employed a simple 
syllogism. The Fourth Amendment speaks of searches that all 
involve physical intrusions and lead to the seizing of material 
things. The search in Olmstead did not require any physical 
intrusion or seize material things because the agents tapped 
into the defendants' telephones without having to trespass on 
private property and recorded their conversations. 102 There-
fore, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to wiretapping. 103 
Of course, the Court emphasized that this does not mean that 
privacy of telephone conversations can never be protected, only 
that such protection must come from Congress. 104 According to 
Chief Justice Taft, the searches regulated by the Constitution 
are only those tltat involve a physical trespass, a11d ur1less a 
search occurs, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. 105 Taft's 
99. 277 U.S. at 457-66. 
100. Id. at 455-57. 
101. See Gutterman, supra note 16, at 650 (describing the Supreme Court 
as employing a "means" rather than a "privacy" model). 
102. Olnistead, 277 U.S. at 464 (noting that there was no "actual entrance 
into the private quarters of [the] defendant" or "the taking away of something 
tangible. Here we have testimony only of voluntary conversations secretly 
overheard."). 
103. Id. 
104. !d. at 465-66. 
105. In Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924), the Court narrowed 
tllis test even further by adding the requirement that the physical intrusion 
take place in a protected area. 
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approach effectively limited the amendment's reach to only 
those searches that immediately concerned the Founders. To 
the extent that government chooses to employ new technologies 
that can invade individual liberty without physical intrusion, 
the Fourth Amendment would not stand in its way. 
While the Supreme Court ultimately rejected Olmstead's 
narrow interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz v. 
United States, 106 it did not tear down Taft's analytical frame-
work. Olmstead's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's 
reference to search and seizure as words of limitation continues 
to be the foundation for the Court's current doctrine. In Katz, 
the Court was asked once again to examine the validity of a 
wiretap. Instead of a home, however, this time the telephone 
tapped was a public telephone booth. 107 In holding that the 
amendment protects "people, not places," the Court in Katz 
adopted the general rule that "[w]hat a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a sub-
ject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected."108 Instead of determining 
whether government had physically intruded into a protected 
area, the central question would now be whether the individual 
had a subjectively and objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 109 Because Katz sought to exclude the "uninvited ear" 
by closing the door to a public telephone booth, he was "entitled 
to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece [would] 
not be broadcast to the world."110 How the government de-
feated that expectation was irrelevant. Because the wiretap-
ping of the telephone booth was not authorized by "the deliber-
ate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer," it violated the 
Fourth Amendment. III 
While abandoning Olmstead's narrow focus on physical in-
trusions, the Katz analysis maintains Olmstead's focus on de-
106. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("Once it is recognized that the Fourth 
Amendment protects people--and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment 
cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any 
given enclosure."). 
107. Id. at 348. 
108. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted). 
109. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
110. I d. at 352. 
111. Id. at 357 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 
(1963)). 
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termining whether government conduct should be considered a 
search. If the information is exposed to the public, gathering of 
that information is not a search and the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply. If the information is private, then government 
gathering of that information is a search requiring a warrant or 
consent. 112 Katz, therefore, does not reject the Olmstead in-
quiry so much as it expands the scope of that inquiry. Melvin 
Gutterman has argued that Katz went further, "declaring that 
a privacy value-oriented analysis should replace" the Ollnstead 
approach. 113 Standing alone, I would agree with Gutterman 
that logically Katz should be interpreted as employing an 
analysis focused on determining privacy values rather than ex-
amining the means employed by government. 
The entire thrust of the [Katz] opinion is that it is needless to ask 
successively whether an individual has the kind of interest that the 
fourth amendment protects and whether that interest is invaded by a 
kind of governmental activity characterizable by its attributes as a 
"search." Rather, a "search" is anything that invades interests pro-
tected by the amendment.ll4 
However, by failing to provide any real guidance or substance 
to tl1e privacy ·value, the opinion did not sl1ut tl1e door to exaln-
ining means, and subsequent decisions have taken advantage 
of this opening, artfully transforming the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test into a means-oriented analysis. 115 Accord-
ingly, "[a]s long as the manner of acquiring the information 
could be squeezed into the Katz terminology, the nature of the 
privacy value implicated need only be minimally examined."116 
As At--nsterdat-n recognized, simply by substituting the phrase 
"government intrusion" for the finding that the government 
had "violated" Katz's interests creates the "subtle suggestion 
that a particular kind or sort of government activity, labeled an 
'intrusion,' is necessary to trigger the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment."117 Regardless of 'Nhat Katz originally intended, 
112. Id. at 353. 
113. Gutterman, supra note 16, at 662. 
114. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 383. 
115. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) ("A 'search' occurs 
'when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable 
is infringed."') (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)); 
see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-33 (2001) (describing the 
Court's means analysis); Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237-
38 (1986) (focusing on the manner of surveillance to determine that the takmg 
of aerial photographs was not a search). 
116. Gutterman, supra note 16, at 711. 
117. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 383. 
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if Olmstead interpreted the Fourth Amendment's reference to 
searches as limited only to those searches the Founders feared, 
Katz and its progeny now interpret the Amendment as applying 
only to searches analogous to those the Founders feared. 
Since Katz, a multitude of factors are considered to deter-
mine whether new technologies are similar to the searches the 
Founders feared. 118 These factors include 1) the nature of the 
place to be observed; 2) the ease of observation; 3) the location 
of the observer, including whether surveillance requires physi-
cal intrusion; 4) the nature of the object or activity observed; 5) 
the availability of the technology to the general public; 6) 
whether the technology enhances natural senses; and 7) the 
duration and scope of the surveillance. 119 These factors are 
non-exclusive, with some weightier than others, and as the fol-
lowing discussion illustrates arguably the first and third are 
the most important for technologically enhanced searches. 12o 
Consider the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. 
Knotts 121 and United States v. Karo 122 in which the Court con-
sidered whether using electronic tracking devices constituted a 
search under the Fourth Amendment. In Knotts, the police 
placed a "beeper" or radio transmitter in a five-gallon drum of 
chloroform.I23 Using the beeper, they were able to track the 
drum from its place of purchase in Minnesota to the Knotts' 
cabin in Wisconsin in which they discovered a drug labora-
tory. 124 In upholding the warrantless use of the beeper, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the information provided by the 
beeper was no different than what the officers could have ob-
118. See Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveil-
lance: The American Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J. 
L. & TECH. 383, 390-404 (1997) (summarizing the factors from the case law); 
Steinberg, supra note 16, at 583-605 (arguing that the Supreme Court should 
consider 1) physical trespass; 2) the visual/aural distinction; 3) plain view 
analogies; and 4) implicit consent). 
119. Slobogin, supra note 118, at 390-98. 
120. Some commentators have suggested that practically speaking, the Su-
preme Court is simply determining whether the search in question was rea-
sonable. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1484-85 (1985) (arguing that in many circumstances, the 
Supreme Court is simply evaluating the reasonableness of the search); Stuntz, 
supra note 27, at 557-62 (arguing that in the ordinary criminal case Fourth 
Amendment law is analogous to the law of negligence). 
121. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
122. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
123. 460 U.S. at 277. 
124. Id. at 277-79. 
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served visually. 125 Accordingly, "[n] othing in the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory 
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement 
as science and tech~ology afforded them in this case."126 In 
contrast, government agents in Karo used a beeper to track 
fifty gallons of ether not only on public roads, but also to locate 
the ether within specific residences.I 27 The Court began by de-
scribing private residences as "places in which the individual 
normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not au-
thorized by a warrant."128 It then held that monitoring of the 
beeper within private residences violated the Fourth Amend-
ment, because it allowed the government to "obtain information 
that it could not have obtained by observation from outside the 
curtilage of the house."l29 · 
While outwardly these decisions follow Katz, they do so 
only formalistically. Noticeably absent is any real effort to 
evaluate whether electronic surveillance should be considered 
the equivalent of visual surveillance or why a residence should 
be treated differently than a moving vehicle. Practically, these 
decisions would allo-w government to monitor any individual 
outside of the home t-wenty-four hours a day without any dis-
cussion of how that monitoring might affect the individual or 
what that surveillance might do to the relationship between 
government and individual.l30 As Justice Brennan argued in 
another case, technologically en h. anced surveillance is "more 
penetrating, more indiscriminate, more truly obnoxious to a 
free society. Electronic surveillance, in fact, makes the police 
omniscient; and police omniscience is one of the most effective 
tools of tyram1y."131 Instead, Knotts and Karo mechanically ap-
ply Katz's statement that government surveillance of vvhat an 
individual exposes to the public is not a search.132 
125. Id. at 282. 
126. Id. 
127. 468 U.S. at 708. 
128. Id. at 714. 
129. Id. at 715. 
130. Gutterman, supra note 16, at 705. 
131. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). 
132. In substance and spirit, Knotts and Karo are also closer to Olmstead 
than Ratz. By recognizing a significant distinction between the public roads 
and private residences, these decisions effectively resurrect Olmstead's reli-
ance upon property interests. This trend in the doctrine is even more appar-
ent in the Court's decisions involving overflights. See California v. Ciraolo, 
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Another illustration of the means approach and its formal-
istic reliance on "public exposure" can be found in Smith v. 
Maryland. 133 In Smith, a victim of a robbery received threaten-
ing and obscene telephone calls from an individual identifying 
himself as the robber.134 When police subsequently identified 
Smith as fitting the robber's description, they had the tele-
phone company install a pen register to record the phone num-
bers dialed by Smith. 135 The register revealed that Smith sub-
sequently called the victim.136 In holding that the use of the 
pen register was not a search, the Court concluded that Smith 
could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
numbers he dialed because his use of the phone "voluntarily 
conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and 
'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary 
course of business."l37 Not only was the information collected 
by the pen registry more limited than that collected by wire-
taps, it did not divulge the contents of the communication.l38 
Having thus exposed this information, the Court concluded 
that Smith "assumed the risk" that the telephone company 
might turn this information over to the police. 139 The Court 
reached this conclusion by assuming away rather than examin-
ing the privacy values at stake. 
While not high technology, government use of drug-sniffing 
canines highlights some of the other factors considered in de-
termining whether a search has occurred. These factors have 
clear implications for government use of technological tools. In 
476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (holding that visual surveillance of a homeowner's 
backyard was not a search despite the existence of a ten foot fence enclosing 
the backyard); Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) 
(holding that the use of a commercial mapping camera from an airplane was 
not a search). These decisions effectively hold that, because the areas under 
surveillance were visible to the flying public and because the police did not 
trespass to obtain the information but instead conducted their surveillance 
from a publicly accessible vantage point, the Fourth Amendment does not ap-
ply. 
133. 442 u.s. 735 (1979). 
134. Id. at 737. 
135. ld. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 744. 
138. Id. at 741 (noting that a pen register "differs significantly from the lis-
tening device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of 
communications."). 
139. Id. at 744. 
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United States v. Place/40 the Supreme Court held that use of a 
highly trained dog to sniff for narcotics was not a search gov-
erned by the Fourth Amendment.14l In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the Court characterized the dog sniff as much less intru-
sive than a typical search because it does not require the 
opening of luggage or the exposure of non-contraband items. 142 
Moreover, the information gathered is limited; the canine sniff 
determines only whether narcotics are present.143 According to 
the Court, the focused and limited nature of this inquiry "en-
sures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the em-
barrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate 
and more intrusive investigative methods."I44 While the Court 
opined that dog sniffs are sui generis, 145 Place can be used to 
exempt technologically assisted searches as well. 
As the foregoing decisions demonstrate, in determining 
whether the Fourth Amendment regulates government 
searches, the Supreme Court asks whether a particular search 
is similar to those the Founders feared. It should be apparent 
that by focusing on the means employed by government in con-
ducting its investigation, this approach allows technology to 
dictate the degree of privacy and secru-ity that society will en-
joy. To the extent that surveillance tools like beepers, pen reg-
isters, and drug-sniffing dogs do not raise the same or similar 
privacy concerns as rummaging by colonial customs officers, 
the Fourth Amendment does not apply. As illustrated by the 
following three examples, new technologies are likely to erode 
privacy even further. 
1. Net-Wide Searches and Magic Lanterns 
Today, more and more individuals own or use computers 
connected with one another through the Internet. Suppose the 
FBI created a program to scour all of these computers for spe-
cific files such as child pornography or copyright infringing 
mp3s. 146 If the program finds the specified file, it notifies the 
FBI that the information has been found and where it is lo-
140. 462 u.s. 696 (1983). 
141. Id. at 707 (1983) . 
. 142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 17 
(1999). 
2002] THE FOUNDERS' PRIVACY 1351 
cated. If it finds nothing, the program erases itself. This pro-
gram would not interfere with computer operations or func-
tionalities. The owner of the computer would not even know it 
was there. Would the use of the program represent a search 
subject to the Fourth Amendment? · 
When originally popularized by Lawrence Lessig, this "net-
wide search" was merely hypothetical. Today, it is one step 
closer to reality. Toward the end of 2001, the FBI confirmed 
that it was developing an Internet surveillance program code-
named "Magic Lantern."147 Magic Lantern would allow the FBI 
to install a program that records every keystroke on a person's 
computer without the need to physically access the computer. 148 
The FBI would accomplish this by using many of the same 
techniques and exploiting many of the same weaknesses in 
commercial software that hackers use for delivering viruses 
across the Internet. 149 Magic Lantern and its predecessor, the 
"Key Logger System," have been designed to respond to the 
criminal and terrorist use of encryption to scramble messages 
and computer files. 150 Recently, a U.S. District Court upheld 
the FBI's use of the key logger system to obtain information 
needed to read the computer files of an accused organized crime 
figure who used a popular encryption program. lSI 
Arguably, especially to the uninitiated, the net-wide search 
and Magic Lantern should run afoul of the Fourth Amendment 
in the absence of a warrant. After all, a net-wide search could 
be considered the cyber-equivalent of a general warrant, both of 
them gathering information that individuals endeavor to keep 
secret, and both in some sense acts of trespass. 152 Both also 
give government unfettered discretion to intrude into an indi-
147. See Ted Bridis, FBI Develops Eavesdropping Tools, AP ONLINE, Nov. 
22, 2001, WL 30247847; FBI Confirms MSNBC.COM Story on "Magic Lan-
tern," BUS. WIRE, Dec, 13, 2001, WL 12113/01 Bus. Wire (reporting in both 
wire service items the existence of Magic Lantem and describing the pro-
gram). 
148. Bridis, supra note 147. 
149. See id. 
150. Cf. id. (explaining problems with using the "Key Logger System," 
which mandated a "sneak-and-peak warrant" to "attach" a "device to a com-
puter."). For a definition of encryption see infra text accompanying note 157 .. 
151. See John P. Martin, FBI Upheld on Use ofCyber-Snoop, STAR LEDGER, 
Dec. 27, 2001, at 21. 
152. See, e.g., eBay v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000) (holding that a claim of trespass to computers is legally cognizable); 
Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1023-24 (S.D. 
Ohio 1997) (recognizing a claim of trespass to computers). 
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vidual's computer without any evidence that the individual has 
committed any wrongdoing. Under the Supreme Court's cur-
rent doctrine, however, it is possible for a court to conclude that 
the Fourth Amendment does not govern the FBI's use of these 
technologies at all. Assuming that these programs are de-
signed to capture only a limited amount of information or only 
co:qtraband information, l53 they would appear to be the cyber-
equivalent of the dog sniff in Place. 154 These searches are less 
intrusive than physical searches-they gather only limited in-
formation, and they minimize embarrassment and inconven-
ience. Moreover, to the extent that some members ofthe public 
(i.e., hackers) may access the same information through the 
Internet, a court may conclude that the information is not pri-
vate because individuals assume the risk that others, including 
the government, may access this information once a computer 
is connected to the Internet.l55 
2. Encryption/Decryption 
In an age in which significant amounts of information are 
both transmitted and stored electronically, to what extent 
should the use of encryption establish a reasonable expectation 
of privacy? More specifically, must the government obtain a 
warrant before it can decrypt an encrypted file? The impor-
tance of these questions cannot be overstated. As Judge 
Fletcher recognized, 
Whether we are surveilled by our government, by criminals, or by our 
neighbors, it is fair to say that never has our ability to shield our af-
fairs from prying eyes been at such a low ebb. The availability and 
use of secure encryption may offer an opportunity to reclaim some 
portion of the privacy we have lost. Government efforts to control en-
cryption thus may well iinplicate not only the First Amendment 
rights of cryptographers intent on pushing the boundaries of their 
science, but also the constitutional rights of each of us as potential re-
153. This is a fairly significant assumption, and was one of the key issues 
in the Scarfo investigation. The FBI refused to disclose how the key logger 
system functions, and the district court ultimately concluded that the defen-
dant was only entitled to a summary of how the program functioned. See 
United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 580-81 (D.N.J. 2001); Martin, 
supra note 151, at 21. 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42. 
155. See United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508-09 (W.D. Va. 
1999) (concluding that individuals have no reasonable expectations of privacy 
in their Internet IP addresses because those addresses are voluntarily exposed 
to others). 
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cipients of encryption's bounty.l56 
In brief, encryption is the process of running a readable plain-
text message through a computer program that translates the 
message according to an equation or algorithm into an unread-
able ciphertext. Decryption is the process of translating the ci-
phertext back to plaintext, which is usually accomplished by 
the use of an encryption key. 157 Magic Lantern is designed to 
enable government to obtain encryption keys, but because en-
cryption is based upon an algorithm, it is possible to break the 
encryption and decrypt the message without the key either by 
figuring out the algorithm, and then translating the message 
oneself, or by randomly entering information until that infor-
mation matches the key. 158 For example, pig Latin is a simple 
form of encryption in which English words are rearranged and 
additional syllables added according to a predetermined set of 
rules. It is possible of course to break or decrypt a message in 
pig Latin simply by determining what the rules are or by rear-
ranging the words and syllables at random until they become a 
coherent message. State of the art encryption, however, is 
much more difficult to break.159 To the extent that it is even 
possible, breaking sophisticated encryption requires the use of 
supercomputers, and even those computers might take years to 
unscramble the information.16° 
At first glance, by rendering electronic messages undeci-
pherable, encryption would appear to create a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy because it could be the digital equivalent of 
sealing correspondence in an envelope. In fact, the term enve-
lope is regularly used to describe the encryption of messages.I6I 
156. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999), 
withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308, 1309 (1999). 
157. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (N.D. Cal. 
1997), affd Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), 
rehearing granted, opinion withdrawn Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 192 
F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999). 
158. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption 
Create a "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy"?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 503, 529-30 
(2001) (noting that since "an encryption 'key' is really just a string of O's and 
1's, decryption programs generally work by trying every possible combination 
until the right key happens to be found (so-called 'brute force' methods)"). 
159. Cf. id. at 503. 
160. See id. ("Because encryption keys are in most cases impossible to 
guess-trying to guess a single key could occupy a supercomputer for millions 
of years--encryption offers Internet users a degree of privacy in Internet 
communications that remains unequaled in the physical world."). 
161. Cf. Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY 
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If encryption were considered the equivalent of using a sealed 
envelope, then it would appear that the Supreme Court would 
require the government to obtain a warrant before it could de-
crypt messages either through the use of a key or by breal\::ing 
the encryption. 162 After all, individuals have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in sealed envelopes, at!d opening sealed 
envelopes is considered a search.I63 
Once again, though, the Supreme Court's current doctrine 
leaves room for doubt. Relying upon the concepts of public ex-
posure and assumption of risk, Orin Kerr has argued that gov-
ernment efforts to decrypt messages should not be considered 
searches under the Fourth Amendment. 164 According to Kerr, 
once the government obtains ail encrypted message, the mes-
sage itself is effectively "in plain view."165 Encryption, there-
fore, merely affects the government's abibty to understand the 
message, not to access it.l66 As such, he argues that when "the 
government obtains communications in a form that it does not 
understand, the Fourth Amendment does not require law en-
forcement to obtain a warrant before translating the documents 
into understandable English."167 In other words, government 
decryption of a message is no different than the government's 
translation of Spanish into English, 168 which is not considered a 
search under the Constitution.I69 
TECH. L.J. 629, 672 (2000) (drawing an analogy between "envelopes for writ-
ten correspondence" and encryption). 
162. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: CT)'ptography, the 
Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 871 (1995) (argu-
ing that encryption "is armor around a communication much like a safe is ar-
mor around a possession. A person who puts something in a safe to which 
they have the only key or combi_r1ation surely has both a subjective and objec-
tive reasonable expectation of privacy."). 
163. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 727 (1877); United States v. Robin-
son, 414 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
164. Kerr, supra note 158, at 505; see also Note, Keeping Secrets in Cyber· 
space: Establishing Fourth A.mendment Protection for Internet Communica-
tion, llO Ff..ARV. L. REV. 1591, 1604 (1997) ("Unlike a communication hidden 
by a password, an encrypted message can still be viewed, albeit in encoded 
form .... [T]he encoded message, once observed, may be decoded without im-
plicating the Fourth Amendment .... "). 
165. Kerr, supra note 158, at 520. 
166. See id. at 517-20. 
167. Jd. at 518. 
168. See id. 
169. See United States v. Langoria, 177 F.3d l179, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that a defendant who spoke in Spanish had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy that the communication would not be translated because he know-
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3. Carnivore 
Lastly, consider the government's program DCSlOOO-
otherwise known as "Carnivore." Carnivore is a device capable 
of collecting and monitoring all online activities from e-mail to 
web surfmg at a particular Internet service provider (ISP). 170 
According to the FBI, Carnivore would be configured so that it 
could return certain sought-after information. 17l It would ac-
complish this by capturing all of the information that passes 
through an ISP, and then extracting only the sought-after in-
formation.172 For example, if the FBI sought to determine with 
whom a particular individual was corresponding via e-mail, 
Carnivore could be configured to "filter out" all other informa-
tion, including the content of that individual's e-mail. 173 While 
it would chew all the information that came through the Inter-
net, it would only digest the sought-after information. Carni-
vore, therefore, can be programmed to limit the information 
viewed by human eyes.174 In many respects, Carnivore is the 
mirror image of the net-wide search. Instead of "going out" 
onto the net to search for information, however, the device col-
lects information as it passes through one of the Internet's 
many gateways. Like an information roadblock, it screens all 
traffic, but pulls over only the data packets it has been pro-
grammed to capture. 
Despite the fact that Carnivore effectively collects all of the 
information going through an ISP and searches that informa-
tion, an argument can be made that the government would not 
need a warrant or court order to unleash Carnivore.175 Smith 
suggests that because an Internet user knowingly exposes in-
formation to her ISP, she assumes the risk that the ISP may 
ingly exposed his communication to others and assumed the risk that it would 
be translated). 
170. See Donald M. Kerr, Lab. Div., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Carni-
vore Diagnostic Tool, Statement for the Record, United States Senate, Com-
mittee on the Judiciary (Sept. 6, 2000), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ 
congress/congress00/kerr090600.htm. 
171. !d. 
172. !d. 
173. See id. 
174. See id. 
175. This assumes that Carnivore does not report the contents of e-mails or 
online aural communications, which would be arguably governed by Katz and 
the wire tape provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. See 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
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turn this information over to the government. 176 If Carnivore is 
programmed, for example, to capture the addresses of people 
with whom an individual is corresponding via e-mail, the anal-
ogy to Smith and the capturing of telephone numbers is even 
closer. Knotts could also be used to exempt the tracking of an 
individual's online activities. 177 The individual exposes her web 
viewing habits to more than just her ISP; they are exposed to 
the various websites someone visits, the companies that gather 
this information for marketing purposes, and potential hackers 
as well. Arguably, web surfing is much like driving on the pub-
lic streets. Likewise, Place could be relied upon because even 
though Camivore searches all of the information at an ISP, 
unless it is the sought-after information, it is not viewed by 
human eyes, thus minimizing intrusion, embarrassment, and 
inconvenience. 178 It is possible, therefore, to argue that Carni-
vore is not similar enough to the searches the Founders feared. 
As these cases and examples illustrate, as technology be-
comes more powerful and capable of gathering information 
without trespassing or opening locked doors and drawers, cur-
rent Fourth Amenflment law suggests that the use of sur.reil-
lance tec}mology is not a search. Whether one agrees with the 
results of the precefling cases or examples •Nill depend a great 
deal on how one defines privacy Rn.d how one balances the 
needs of law enforcement against individual security. What-
ever one may think about the merits, by limiting the Fourth 
Amendment to only those searches that are sufficiently similar 
to those the Founders feared, the Supreme Court has allowed 
technology to diminish the level of privacy and security we can 
expect in society. While this should certainly be of some con-
cern to all of us, it is not the most troubling consequence of the 
Court's current approach. Debating over the definition of pri-
vacy and whether or not a particular search invades such a 
right distracts us from the fundamental power shift that has 
occurred under the current interpretation of the amendment. 
176. See United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va. 
1999) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information). 
177. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (using as an analogy 
the fact that "[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another"). 
178. See supra text accompanying note 141. 
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B. DISCRETION AND POWER 
Under the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment, the Constitution plays only a small role in 
restraining government power, and the people play virtually no 
role in defining the scope of that power. The irony is, of course, 
that what the Founders feared was not the invasion of privacy 
per se, but how and when those invasions would occur. AB Part 
I discussed, the Founders were more concerned about limiting 
government's power to invade any aspect of life without suffi-
cient cause than with defining what aspects of life should be off 
limits to government. The Founders also believed that the peo-
ple should play a significant role in making this determination. 
The Supreme Court's current approach does more than ignore 
these concerns-it undermines them. AB it stands, the Su-
preme Court has transformed the Fourth Amendment from a 
constitutional provision delineating the scope of governmental 
power generally as determined by the people into a provision 
that protects only isolated pockets of interests as determined by 
judges. 
According to the Suprellle Court, the Fourth Amendment 
establishes a general rule that for a search to be considered 
reasonable it must be authorized by warrant.I79 Although the 
Court has never seriously questioned this rule, it has spent 
over a quarter of a century creating exceptions to it. 180 And, 
"reading a warrant requirement into the amendment, and then 
reading an elaborate set of exceptions into that warrant re-
quirement, seems more like rewriting the amendment than 
reading it as written."181 The Court has accomplished this feat, 
as Justice Black noted, by "clever word juggling."182 Seizing 
upon the concept of privacy as secrecy despite the fact that Katz 
itself recognized that the amendment "cannot be translated 
into a general constitutional 'right to privacy,"' and that "its 
protections go further,"183 later Courts have narrowly defined 
what constitutes a search for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment-categorically excluding certain government acts 
from constitutional scrutiny .184 
179. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
180. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (discussing twenty-two exceptions to the warrant requirement). 
181. AMAR, supra note 29, at 68-69. 
182. Katz, 389 U.S. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting). 
183. Id. at 350. 
184. See supra Part II.A. 
1358 IvJINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [V"ol.86:1325 
In contrast, in his now famous dissent in Olm,stead, Justice 
Brandeis took issue with what he perceived as the Court's "un-
duly literal" interpretation of the amendment. According to 
Brandeis, 
When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted, "the form 
that evil had theretofore taken," had been necessarily simple. Force 
and violence were then the only means known to man by which a gov-
ernment could directly effect self-incrimination. It could compel the 
individual to testifY-a compulsion effected, if need be, by torture. It 
could secure possession of his papers and other articles incident to his 
private life--a seizure effected, if need be, by breaking and entry .... 
But "time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and 
purposes." Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy 
have become available to the govemment. Discovery a..11d invention 
have made it possible for the govemme~t, by means far more effective 
than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is 
whispered in the closet.l85 
The protection afforded by the Constitution for individual liber-
ties must, Brandeis argued, change to meet the problems of the 
day.l86 Because teclmology will continue to develop new and 
even more powerful means for gathering information, the Court 
should guarantee the "right to be let alone," the right of P....meri-
cans to be secure not only in their physical possessions, but also 
"in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions."187 As such, Brandeis rejected means analysis, and ar-
gued that the protections guaranteed by the Constitution are 
much broader in scope. Instead of preventing only those inva-
sions ofliberty sufficiently similar to what the Founders feared, 
the Court's role should be to protect individuals from all intru-
sions into the right to be let alone. 188 Because wiretapping vio-
lated this liberty and was arguably an even greater invasion 
than more traditional searches and seizures, he considered the 
government's actions unlawful under the Fourth Amend-
ment.189 
Except on the rare occasions when the Supreme Court rec-
ognizes a search as a search, the determination ofwhether gov-
ernment may use technolog-y to engage in surveillance and how 
to use that technology is left entirely to the discretion oflaw en-
forcement. The people play almost no role in determining the 
· 185. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
186. See id. at 472. 
187. Id. at 478. 
188. See id. 
189. See id. at 475-79. 
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scope of government's power or whether any particular exercise 
of that power is reasonable. Either the Supreme Court consid-
ers the use of technology a search requiring a warrant, or the 
govemment's use of the technology is absolutely unrestrained 
by the Constitution.l 90 In so doing, the Court has interpreted 
the Fourth Amendment to vest the authority to determine the 
appropriate level of privacy and security in this nation in an in-
stitution whose power the Founders sought to restrain. The 
Justices certainly have "stood the [F]ourth [A]mendment on its 
head."191 
Consider once again the Court's decision in Olmstead. Of-
ten overshadowed by the debate between Taft and Brandeis 
over how to define privacy is their exchange over the role of the 
underlying state law. In Olmstead, a state law prohibited wire-
tapping.192 The federal officers, however, obtained the evidence 
against Olmstead by violating that state law. Taft treated this 
fact as irrelevant for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, 
and merely concluded that, under the common law, evidence is 
admissible even if illegally obtained.193 In contrast, both 
Brandeis and Holmes believed that the prosecution should not 
have been allowed to continue precisely because of the govem-
ment's misconduct.194 Both Justices were concemed with this 
abuse "on behalf of the United States,"195 and believed that the 
evidence should have been excluded, 196 but neither considered 
state law relevant in determining the reasonableness of the 
search under the Fourth Amendment. Brandeis argued that 
the case should be dismissed as a matter of equity, 197 while 
Holmes argued that the exclusionary rule should be applied to 
violations of law in addition to violations of the Constitution.198 
In light of the role that common-law trespass played in this re-
190. See Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 388 ("On the other hand, if it is not 
labeled a "search" or "seizure," it is subject to no significant restriction of any 
kind."). 
191. See TAYLOR, supra note 78, at 23-24. 
192. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 469. 
193. See id. at 467-68. 
194. See id. at 480 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 469-70 (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). 
195. ld. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
196. Id. at 480 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see id. at 469-70 (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). 
197. See id. at 483-84 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
198. See id. at 469-70 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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gard, 199 the omission is particularly troublesome because it ig-
nores the role that both federalism and the people play in con-
trolling governmental discretion and safeguarding individual 
liberty under the amendment.2°0 This is not to suggest that 
state law or federal statutes are the only or preferred means of 
protecting individual liberty, but rather that courts should not 
ignore the important role legislatures play in our tripartite 
government in determining the appropriate amount of power to 
be exercised by law enforcement. Laws prohibiting certain 
forms or means of information gathering, therefore, should 
limit executive power and define at least minimum levels of 
privacy and security protected by the Fourth Amendment. 201 
In defense of the Justices, the adoption of this interpretive 
framework may well be explained as recognition that the police 
require significant discretion at what I will call the micro 
level-how best to exercise power in a particular situation or to 
capture a particular criminaL The police constantly deal with 
danger and the unknown, and they must have the power to 
protect themselves as well as the public in highly fluid situa-
tions. Likewise, through their unique experiences, officers may 
develop special expertise and judgment, and society is bette:r· off 
when experienced officers are allowed to follow their hunches 
and target suspects to prevent a crime from occurring or to cap-
ture them after the fact. So when a suspect uses encryption to 
hide he:r computer files, it is generally up to the police to de-
termine the best way to obtain that evidence, whether it be by 
breal\.ing into the computer and physically implanting a key 
logger, using Magic Lantern over the Internet, or convincing an 
accomplice to copy the files. Given that the Supreme Court de-
cides individual cases in which law enforcement's exercise of 
micro-level discretion actually uncovered evidence of a crime 
and led to the capture of the perpetrator, it would be difficult to 
conclude that the exercise of that discretion was unreasonable 
199. See supra Part I. 
200. AMAR, supra note 29, at 76 ("Vindication of [Fourth Amendment] re-
strictions would largely come from state bodies. State statutes and state 
common law, after all, would typically define and protect ordinary individuals' 
property rights to their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects.' Thus state lmv 
would initially create the trespass cause of action that would enable ordinary 
men and women to challenge unconstitutional intrusions by federal officials." 
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)). 
201. Of course, unless passed by Congress, laws prohibiting the use of sur-
veillance technologies will vary from state to state, leaving open the possibility 
that individual liberties will vary as well. 
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unless it led to discriminatory harassment of individuals or se-
lective enforcement ofthe law. 
However, we should not confuse police decisionmaking at 
the micro level with macro level decisions that determine the 
scope of executive power in general. While the Constitution 
may permit a degree of deference at the micro level, it leaves 
little room at the macro level. The decision to adopt a new form 
of surveillance technology is just such a macro-level decision. 
The decision to adopt Magic Lantern or Carnivore is a determi-
nation to expand the powers and capabilities of the executive 
branch and correspondingly to reduce the level of privacy and 
security individuals may expect and enjoy. Whatever deference 
law enforcement may be entitled to with respect to micro level 
discretion, it is entitled to none at the macro level. Unfortu-
nately, the Court's current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
virtually ignores the distinction between micro and macro-level 
decisionmaking, and never questions from where law enforce-
ment derives its authority to adopt these new technologies. 
The Supreme Court's failure to question the source of law 
enforcement's power to adopt new technologies leads to a sig-
nificant incongruity. The individual officer, a relatively low 
member of the executive branch, in many respects, has more 
discretionary power than the President. Unlike the President, 
whose power in general must be granted either directly by the 
Constitution or by acts of Congress,202 many of the activities 
the police engage in are not authorized by law at all, but are in-
stead conducted under "their broad general duties to enforce 
the law and keep the peace."203 While the Supreme Court care-
fully scrutinizes presidential claims of inherent authority, it 
appears to assume the President's inherent authority when law 
enforcement is concerned.204 In this respect, the Supreme 
202. See supra Part LB. 
203. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 386; see also Dow Chern. Co. v. United 
States, 476 U.S. 227, 233 (1986) (''Regulatory or enforcement authority gener-
ally carries with it all the modes of inquiry and investigation traditionally em-
ployed or useful to execute the authority granted."). 
204. One might argue that this assumption is warranted because state 
constitutions do not follow the same doctrine of separation of powers as the 
U.S. Constitution. While one can argue that state legislative power is broader 
than congressional legislative power, there is no support for the argument that 
the doctrine of separation of powers with respect to state executive power dif-
fers from the federal doctrine. As even a critic of this approach recognizes, 
"federal precedent sets the terms for much state separation of powers debate, 
and federal principles provide a presumptive standard for state constitutional 
decisions." Robert A Shapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separa-
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Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence must learn from its 
evaluation of presidential power in the Steel Seizure Case. 
Unless the people grant the executive branch the power in 
question either through the Constitution or through legislation, 
claims of inherent executive power are suspect.205 As it stands, 
under the Court's current approach, the people play absolutely 
no role in determining the extent and reasonableness of gov-
ernment's power to search. Instead, the Court treats law en-
forcement as having unfettered government power to invade 
individual privacy and security subject only to a few not so well 
defined but limited exceptions defined by the Court. Whatever 
role the Fourth Amendment might have played in regulating 
executive power consistently with the doctrine of separation of 
powers, in many instances it currently plays no role whatso-
ever. Tllis state of affairs is precisely what the Founders feared 
most. 
III. A HEAT SOURCE AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL? 
The Supreme Court's most recent Fourth Amendment de-
cision involving new technolog::v may be the first step in pre-
venting the "power of technology to shrink the realm of guaran-
teed privacy,"206 and restoring the Fourth Amendment to its 
intended role of preserving the people's authority to limit unfet-
tered government power. Kyllo u. United States arguably re-
tion of Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 80 (1998); see also 
People v. Moore, 102 N.E.2d 146, 151-52 (Ill. 1951) (recognizing that the doc-
trine of separation of powers only permitted the police to seize items specifi-
cally defined by state statute); Ronald J. Allen, The Police and Substantive 
Rulemahing: Reconciling Principle and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 77 
(1976) ("[T]he state supreme courts have uniformly held that the legislatures 
are the only branch of government possessing the power to legislate."). 
205. See supra Part I.E; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1957) ("In the framework of our Constitution, the Presi-
dent's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that 
he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmak-
ing process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of 
laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about 
who shall malre laws which the President is to execute."); id. at 637-38 (Jack-
son, J., concurring) (''When the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent 
powers [granted by the Constitution] .... When the President takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its 
lowest ebb .... Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclu-
sive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium 
established by our constitutional system."). 
206. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
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frames the Fourth Amendment inquiry from whether the use of 
a particular technology is similar to the searches the Founders 
feared to whether the Founders would have enjoyed "that de-
gree of privacy against government."207 The Kyllo Court fo-
cused on the freedom from government surveillance enjoyed by 
the Founders rather than on the kinds of searches that con-
cemed them. Kyllo limits the erosion .of individual privacy and 
security brought on by new technologies by requiring the use of 
such technologies to be authorized by a warrant. More impor-
tantly, as discussed in Part IV, an approach based upon the 
Founders' privacy is a positive step toward returning to the 
people the authority to determine the extent and reasonable-
ness of government's surveillance power . 
. Suspecting that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana in his 
home, federal agents used a thermal imaging device, the 
Agema Thermovision 210, to scan Kyllo's home.208 Growing 
marijuana indoors ordinarily requires the use of high-intensity 
lamps and, like all heat sources, these lamps emit infrared ra-
diation. Thermal imagers are capable of detecting infrared ra-
diation, whiCh is imperceptible to the human eye, and "operates 
somewhat like a video camera showing heat images."209 The 
scan of Kyllo's home revealed that the garage and a side of his 
home were relatively hotter than the rest of the home and sub-
stantially warmer than his neighbors' homes.210 Based upon 
the scan and other information, a warrant was issued authoriz-
ing a physical search, which resulted in the discovery of more 
than one hundred marijuana plants.211 The district court up-
held the warrantless use of the device because in its estimation 
the device was relatively non-intrusive-it displayed only a 
crude visual image of heat, did not penetrate the walls or win-
dows of the home, and did not reveal any intimate details.212 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia begins by question-
ing the ·Court's assessment of "when a search is not a 
search."213 Noting the disjuncture between the term "search" 
as it is commonly understood and as it is applied in Fourth 
Amendment law, Scalia recognized that the Court has applied 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 29-30. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 31-32. 
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"somewhat in reverse the principle first enunciated in Katz" 
holding that "a Fourth Amendment search does not occur" 
unless the Court concludes that there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.214 This odd state of affairs might be explained 
by the need to reconcile the common law principle that "'the eye 
cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass"'215 while 
preserving "somewhat" the doctrine that warrantless searches 
are presumptively unconstitutionaJ.216 
The opinion then abruptly shifts to the question confront-
ing the Court, which according to the opinion is determining 
the limits, if any, upon the power of police technology to "shrink 
the realm of guaranteed privacy."217 In defining these limits, 
Scalia describes the Court's role as assuring "preservation of 
that degree of privacy against ·government that existed when 
the Fourth Amendment was adopted."218 Consistent with this 
approach, the opinion holds at a minimum that searches of the 
interior of the home must be considered searches under the 
Constitution.219 The Court noted, "We think that obtaining by 
sense-enhancing technology any inJormation regarding the in-
terior of the home that could not othenvise have been obtained 
"Yvithout physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area,' constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the tech-
nology in question is not in general public use."220 According to 
Scalia, this is a "ready criterion, with roots deep in the common 
law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, a_nd that 
is acknowledged to be reasonable."221 Any other conclusion 
"would ... permit police technology to erode the privacy guar-
anteed by the Fourth Amendment."222 
By focusing upon the Founders' privacy, Scalia's opinion 
casts aside means analysis. At first, this rejection is implicit as 
the majority reaches its conclusion without any examination of 
the factors discussed in Part H or relied upon by the lower 
courts. The rejection becomes explicit, however, in response to 
214. !d. 
215. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886) (quoting Entick v. 
Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (K.B. 1765)). 
216. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31-32. 
217. !d. at 34. 
218. !d. 
219. !d. 
220. !d. (citation omitted). 
221. !d. 
222. !d. 
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the argument of the Government and dissent that no search oc-
curred because the device detected only heat radiating outside 
the bouse. That is, the police employed "off-the-wall" rather 
than "through-the-wall surveillance."223 Justice Stevens's dis-
sent is a perfect illustration of means analysis at work. Accord-
ing to Stevens, government use of the thermal imaging device 
in Kyllo should not be considered a search for several reasons.224 
First, the information was obtained from outside of the home 
Without physically penetrating the premises.225 Second, a per-
son has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat ema-
nating from the home because it is exposed to the public.226 
Third, the thermal imaging device did not reveal any intimate 
or embarrassing information about the home.227 In rejecting 
these arguments, Scalia noted that the same analysis would 
permit warrantless searches with any device that simply re-
cords information emanating from the home including powerful 
microphones and satellites.228 Moreover, Scalia criticized this 
type of reasoning as the same "mechanical interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment" rejected in Katz-an approach that, like 
Olmstead, "leave[s] the homeowner at the mercy of advancing 
technology."229 Consequently, Scalia concluded that the gov-
ernment must obtain a warrant before it may use these new 
t hn 1 . 230 ec o og1es. 
As illustrated by the decision, preserving "the degree of 
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted" instead of determining whether a 
search is a search dramatically alters the protection afforded by 
the amendment. Rather than permitting government to ex-
pand its power to conduct surveillance because advances in 
technology distance information gathering from the physical 
searches of the eighteenth century, Kyllo limits government's 
ability to engage in warrantless searches to those considered 
reasonable at the time the amendment was adopted-most no-
tably searches conducted by the unaided senses. The use of 
any technology to enhance those senses would require a war-
223. Id. at 35. 
224. Id. at 41-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 43-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
228. Id. at 35-37. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 40. 
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rant until that technology is in general public use.:m 
Consider once again the examples of the net-wide 
search/Magic Lantern, decry-ption, and Carnivore. As discussed 
in Part II, all three of these technologies might not have been 
considered searches under the means analysis. Under Kyllo 
there would be no question that government use of these tech-
nologies would represent searches. Because these technologies 
did not exist at the time the amendment was adopted and were 
therefore incapable of invading the Founders' privacy, in order 
to use them, law enforcement must first obtain a warrant. In-
stead of the hopelessly subjective analysis that typifies current 
Fourth Amendment analysis, the only questions remaining for 
the courts are objective: Did the police have a warrant or is the 
technology in general public use? For the purposes of this dis-
cussion, I will assume that Kyllo's use of "general public use" 
means what it says: The technolog-y must actually be routinely 
used by the general public and not simply available or used by 
some portion of the public. 232 My reasons fo:r this assumption 
are discussed in Part IV. As the general public does not yet 
conduct net-·wide searches, have the power to decrypt encrypted 
messages, or monitor and capture Internet information flow, a 
warr::~n.t would be required to authorize these searches. 
Justice Scalia's opinion in Kyllo could be interpreted more 
narrowly as applying only to surveillance of the interior of the 
home. After all, the holding is specifically limited to the home, 
231. Kyllo's approach is also preferable to the reasonable expectation of 
privacy analysis because it comes closer to applying the Fourth Amendment as 
written and provides a clear means of determining what the amendment re-
quires. Some may criticize this approach as Olmstead in reverse, locking gov-
ernment into the surveillance technologies and techniques of the eighteenth 
century. If Kyllo's holding was based on the Fourteenth Amendment and sub-
stantive due process, this criticism might be valid as Kyllo would limit gov-
ernment's powers to those that existed at the time the amendment was 
adopted. The Fourth Amendment's limitations are different. Rather than ab-
solutely denying government the power to conduct searches it limits the exer-
cise of that power to circumstances in which government has probable cause. 
As such, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the government from bene-
fiting from new technologies; it merely defines when those technologies may be 
used. 
232. Tllis would appear to be consistent with the majority's conclusion that 
the thermal imaging device in Kyllo was not in general public use. 533 U.S. at 
34. This, despite the fact that, as the dissent points out, there are thousands 
of Thermovision 210s or similar devices that were manufactured and "readily 
available to the public" for purchase or rent. Id. at 47 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (citing App. at 18); see also id. at 50 n.6 (noting that thermal imaging is 
not "routine"). 
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a "constitutionally protected area," and the security of the inte-
rior of the home figures prominently throughout the Court's 
discussion and throughout this nation's history.233 Limiting 
Kyllo to the interior of the home, however, would run counter to 
the Court's return to the true meaning of Katz and the rejection 
of mechanical interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. Such 
a narrow interpretation would instead return Fourth Amend-
ment analysis to Olmstead and not Katz, a result the majority 
clearly wanted to avoid. Moreover, limiting Kyllo to the inte-
rior of the home does nothing to limit government power and 
discretion outside of the home. While Kyllo clearly has the po-
tential to alter the Court's current interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment, should it be embraced? Part IV argues that 
courts should apply the Kyllo analysis not because it is better 
at protecting privacy or protects more privacy, but because it 
preserves the right of the people to determine what powers the 
government should have to engage in surveillance and when 
that power should be considered reasonable.234 
IV. THE PEOPLE'S POVIER 
Prior to Kyllo, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence had 
transformed the Fourth Amendment from a provision circum-
scribing government power and discretion to one accommodat-
ing such power and discretion; only the sophistication of its 
technology limited the government's power.235 This transfor-
mation occurred because the Court limited the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection to privacy and then narrowly interpreted pri-
vacy to create exceptions to the types of searches governed by 
the amendment. Through this doctrine, the Court presumed 
that the goveniinent could employ new surveillance technolo-
gies unless the su:rveillance invaded interests the Justices sub-
jectively considered private. The people's only role in the proc-
ess was to respond to government and the courts after the fact. 
They were relegated to enacting legislation to limit government 
233. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 
(1961)). 
234. AB Justice Stevens notes, Kyllo can be interpreted as under-protective 
of privacy because of the general public use exception. !d. at 46-48 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). In this respect, as evidenced by the general public use excep-
tion, Justice Scalia's continued reliance upon privacy suffers from some of the 
same flaws as the rest of the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The 
definition of general public use will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV.A. 
235. See supra Part II. 
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use of technology or amending the Constitution.236 This section 
outlines why the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo creates an 
opportunity to :return the people to their rightful position as the 
primary source and arbiter of governmental power. Depending 
upon how the Court determines what makes a search reason-
able under the amendment, the Supreme Court may reinforce 
self-governance in two ways. If the Court maintains the per se 
rule against warrantless searches, which I will describe as the 
"moderate thesis," popular sovereignty is reinforced through 
the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause. As Part IV.A ar-
gues, this result is a perfectly reasonable and acceptable inter-
pretation of the amendment, and consistent with the principles 
of constitutional self-governance. If the Court chooses to ex-
pand its interpretation of reasonableness, the "radical thesis," 
Part IV.B argues that reasonableness should only be expanded 
to include surveillance technologies authorized and circum-
scribed by statute subject to judicial review. Under both of 
these approaches, the people, as the Founders intended, would 
determine the reasonableness of government power. 
A. ''W ARRA.J\fTLESS SEft...RCP.cES P...RE U:N'LA WFUL"-THE 
MODERATE THESIS 
Relying upon Kyllo, the Fourth Amendment may be inter-
preted to prohibit any government use of surveillance technol-
ogy not in general public use unless authorized by a: warrant. 
While this interpretation of the amendment may assign more 
weight to the Warrant Clause than some believe the Founders 
might have intended, 237 it nonetheless remains true to the 
Fourth Amendment's ultimate purpose of protecting the peo-
ple's right to dete1·mine the reasonableness of searches. A peT 
se rule simply shifts the vehicle for this determination from the 
common law jury to the Constitution itself. 
As the discussion of the amendment's pre-constitutional 
origins demonstrates, the Fourth .A...mendment could recognize 
two methods for determining when searches are reasonable.238 
Government could conduct a search without a warrant provided 
that the people had the power to oversee those searches di-
rectly. Otherwise, government must obtain a warrant sup-
236. Of course, the people may even indirectly influence tllis process by 
electing executives who promise to alter governmental pracbce and/or nomi-
nate judges whose views on privacy are more consistent with their own. 
237. See supra Part I. 
238. See supra Part I. 
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ported by probable cause. Even though the Founders might 
have been concerned about warrants, the Fourth Amendment 
considers warrants reasonable when they are supported by 
"probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized."239 While a per se warrant rule eliminates 
one method fore determining reasonableness, a rigid adherence 
to the Warrant Clause still applies the people's definition of 
reasonableness as expressed in the clause. Accordingly, a per 
se rule remains faithful to the amendment's purpose of ensur-
ing that the people determine when government may search. 
As discussed in Part II, the problem with pre-Kyllo search and 
seizure cases was not the per se warrant rule, but rather the 
Court's willingness to create exceptions to the rule. By creating 
exceptions to the per se rule, the Justices replaced the judg-
ment of the people with their own. 
- Given the importance of strictly adhering to the warrant 
requirement under a per se rule, Kyllo's exception for technolo-
gies in general public use would appear inconsistent with the 
right of the people. Granted, a general public-use exception 
would be based upon the same underlying flaw as the Court's 
earlier Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, that the amendment 
protects privacy and not power, and whether members of the 
public may invade our privacy does not answer the question of 
whether government may. Similarly, if the Court were to in-
terpret this exception broadly, general public use could become 
an exception that swallows the rule much like Katz's statement 
regarding what one voluntarily exposes to the public. More-
over, as Justice Stevens argued, creating an exception for tech-
nologies in general public use seems "perverse becauseit seems 
likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, 
as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily avail-
able."240 Perhaps, in light of these concerns, Scalia's opinion 
appears to suggest that the Court may be open to reexamining 
the fador. 241 
Despite these concerns, the exception might be acceptable 
precisely because it is based upon an increased threat to pri-
vacy. If limited to only those technologies already routinely 
used by the general public, the exception would apply only un-
239. VB. CONST. amend. N. 
240. Kyllo v. United States, 533 UB. 27, 47 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
241. I d. at 50 n.6. 
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der circumstances in which the public as a whole understands 
the risks and has borne the costs of such tech~1ologies. A strict 
interpretation of general public use, therefore, reduces the risk 
that the public will acquiesce to government use of technology 
because a majority or powerful minority have not internalized 
the costs of such technology, and therefore either misperceive 
the relative costs and benefits or selfishly are willing to allow 
others to pay them.242 If society is to rely upon legislatures to 
protect against governmental invasions of privacy or security, it 
is only appropriate to do so when the use of a technology is so 
ubiquitous that the public as a whole appreciates its threat. 
Only then can we be assured that the absence of legislative 
safeguards results from the public's judgment that the threat is 
acceptable rather than its lack of concern for or discrimination 
against a subset of the population. 
While a per se warrant requirement might be doctrinally 
neater without any exceptions, the general public use exception 
may very well be consistent with the common law origins of the 
amendment and avoids its own unduly mechanical interpreta-
tion of the amendment.243 As Justice Scalia recognized in 
Kyllo, one of the problems with interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment's prohibition against warrantless searches was the 
common law conclusion that the eyes cannot be guilty of tres-
pass. 244 If the police could use their eyes and ears to gather in-
formation without a warrant, then the Fourth Amendment im-
plicitly recognized at least some exceptions from the beginning. 
What is important about the common law rule for natural 
senses is not its pedigree or its historical existence, but rather 
the reason for the exception. Natural senses are by default 
surveillance tools routinely used by the general public. ThP-
public, therefore, has always understood the threat to pTivacy 
and security represented by these senses and has responded 
242. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 25, at 95 (noting that as "the cost 
of law enforcement is more widely distributed, ... there is less reason to fear 
that the governmental decisions to trade off privacy for law enforcement are 
being made without considering everyone's interests equally"). 
243. This does not address the question of whether a warrant should, none-
theless, be required because of concerns over police discretion with respect to 
micro-level decisions (i.e., decisions regarding when technologies should be 
used to search a particular suspect). Others have identified some of the con-
cerns the public use exception creates at that level. See Slobogin, supra note 
26. 
244. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31-32 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
628 (1886)). 
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accordingly by building walls and fences and prohibiting physi-
cal trespass. Technology should be no different. To the extent 
that flashlights, cameras, and binoculars are routinely in gen-
eral public use, we become as familiar with the threats they 
pose as we have with unaided sight. Likewise, we become as 
capable of evaluating and responding to the technology's threat 
either with privacy enhancing technology or by limiting its use 
by law. While it might be reasonable to require the govern-
ment to obtain a warrant even for such technologies, interpret-
ing the Fourth Amendment to require one because of macro-
level decisions could be considered unduly formalistic. 
One serious objection to the general public use exception is 
that formalism serves an important value in this context be-
cause government use of technology is different. To the extent 
that the Fourth Amendment is truly about power rather than 
privacy, the fact that citizens may invade each other's privacy 
does little to answer the question of whether government 
should have the same power.245 No longer slavishly focusing on 
privacy, a per se warrant requirement should arguably apply to 
any new technologies. While one might respond that in light of 
the pervasiveness ofthe technology, the political process can be 
trusted to do what the people think necessary, or that even the 
doctrine of separation of powers recognizes that some executive 
powers may be authorized through legislative acquiescence, 246 
the objection nonetheless deserves serious attention. 
On the other side, one might note that requiring probable 
cause before law enforcement may employ an arguably less in-
trusive technological search may create a disincentive for using 
those technologies. After all, why would the police use a crude 
thermal imaging device if they have sufficient justification for 
conducting a physical search even though the thermal imaging 
device may be less intrusive and a more efficient means of ex-
cluding the innocent? In some instances, law enforcement may 
choose to conduct a physical search rather than resorting to 
technology; it is far from clear, however, that they will auto-
matically prefer physical searches to technological searches. 
On balance, technological surveillance may often be superior to 
245. See Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 406-07. 
246. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (concluding 
that Congress had implicitly authorized the practice of claim settlement by 
executive agreement); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (recognizing that under some cir-
cumstances Congress may implicitly authorize executive actions). 
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physical searches precisely because certain technologies may 
make it possible to exclude suspects with less effort and intru-
sion than a physical search. Likewise, technological searches 
may be superior to physical searches because they permit law 
enforcement to gather information without alerting suspects to 
the investigation. These searches reduce the risk that evidence 
will be destroyed, lead to additional evidence of criminal con-
duct, and help identify additional suspects. Most importantly, 
technologically assisted surveillance may allow law enforce-
ment to gather information from a safe distance without having 
to expose agents to physical harm. Lastly, to the extent that 
this is a subject for debate and discussion, it is either an argu-
ment against recognizing a per se rule under the Fourth 
Amendment, or an argument for amending the Constitution. 
From a policy perspective, supporters of effective law en-
forcement should favor this moderate thesis. First, under the 
Fourth Amendment, law enforcement could adopt technology 
without the need for legislative authorization. While this type 
of executive action may still be suspect under general separa-
tion of powers principles, the Fourth A:rnendment would not 
prohibit it because the warrant requirement guarantees that 
the people have determi."1ed the reasonableness of the search.247 
Second, obtaining a warrant is not a significant burden on law 
enforcement,248 and it brings with it a tremendous benefit-
insulating the search from subsequent constitutional chal-
lenge.249 Kyllo could become the Fourth Amendment equiva-
247. As noted at the beginning of this Article, I am assuming for purposes 
of this discussion that the existence of Fourth Amendment restrictions upon 
government's power to adopt surveillance technologies and to conduct searches 
would satisfY separation of powers concerns. An argument could be made, 
however, that reasonableness can be read as imposing obligations in addition 
to those embodied in the Warrant Clause, including that a search is not rea-
sonable even if supported by a warrant if the search was not authorized by 
statute. 
248. Of course, one may argue that if law enforcement must have probable 
cause to use arguably less intrusive technologies, they would have no reason to 
do so because they would have sufficient justifications for conducting a physi-
cal search. It may be true in some instances that law enforcement may simply 
choose to conduct a physical search rather than use a thermal imaging device, 
Ca_rni.vore, or a tracking device. Law enforcement may, however, choose tech-
nological surveillance over physical surveillance because of the various bene-
fits derived from technological searches, including reduction in physical risk to 
law enforcement and the ability to gather information without alerting the 
suspect to the investigation. 
249. See, e.g., Donald L. Beci, Fidelity to the Warrant Clause: Using Magis-
trates, Incentives, and Telecommunications Technology to Reinvigorate Fourth 
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lent of Miranda warnings250 with the warrant requirement 
serving as a prophylactic rule benefiting government actors 
more than it limits their behavior.251 Third, Kyllo provides 
clear guidance to law enforcement on the use of surveillance 
technologies, and virtually eliminates the uncertainty associ-
ated with the use of new technologies. The only uncertainty 
will be at the margins when it comes to determining whether 
the general public routinely uses a particular technology. 
Fourth, applying the warrant requirement equally to all tech-
nologies (and arguably all search techniques) limits the poten-
tial for judicially created exceptions to encourage differential 
enforcement of criminallaws.252 Lastly, in contrast to the radi-
cal thesis, the moderate thesis requires no changes in constitu-
tional law outside the Fourth Amendment. 
B. ''NOT ALL WARRANTLESS SEARCHES ARE UNLAWFUL"-THE 
RADICAL THESIS 
For decades, commentators have criticized the Supreme 
Court for limiting the Fourth Amendment's definition of rea-
sonableness to warrants.253 In particular these commentators 
have argued that expanding Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness to include searches authorized and circumscribed by stat-
ute or administrative rulemaking would better serve the 
amendment's goal of limiting police discretion while promoting 
responsible police behavior and accountability in ways that the 
Court's all or nothing approach cannot.254 In certain areas of 
Fourth Amendment law, the Court has in fact relaxed the war-
rant requirement in reliance upon statutory authorization or 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 293, 317 (1996) ("As a second 
incentive for government agents to use warrants, the burden of production and 
persuasion should be placed on the defendant if a warrant has been obtained 
to show that a search or seizure is unconstitutional."). 
250. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
251. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits 
and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 554 (1996). But 
see Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 
Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 389-91 (1996). 
252. See Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1047. 
253. See AMAR, supra note 29, at 68-69; Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 358-
59, 367-68; Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regu-
lations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth 
Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 449-50, 468-70 (1990). 
254. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 423-28; LaFave, supra note 253, 
at 451. 
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administrative rules to uphold warrantless searches.255 Kyllo's 
conclusion that the use of surveillance technologies not rou-
tinely used by the general public is a search will most likely 
prompt others to argue that the Court should expand its defini-
tion of reasonableness to include warrantless searches pursu-
ant to statute and administrative rules. As Part IV.A suggests, 
this expansion is not required or even desirable, but if it should 
occur, government use of technology absent a warrant should 
only be considered reasonable when authorized by statute sub-
ject to judicial review. Only under these circumstances would 
the Fourth Amendment guarantee that the people determine 
the reasonableness of government searches, and follow the 
Constitution's separation of powers.256 
While having law enforcement develop and implement a 
process for administrative rulemaking is certainly valuable and 
worthwhile regardless of its Fourth Amendment implications, 
it should not be allowed to replace warrants under the amend-
ment. As discussed earlier, police decisionmaking and discre-
tion can be separated into micro level decisions and macro level 
decisions. 257 Requiring the police to formulate internal rules 
and policies governing searches is a significant step towards 
limiting police discretion at the micro level, that is, when and 
how to conduct searches. Administrative rulemak:ing, however, 
does nothing to alleviate executive discretion at the macro level 
whether law enforcement should have the power to conduct 
255. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-73 (1987) (upholding 
state regulations authorizing probation officers to conduct warrantless 
searches of probationer homes based upon "reasonable grounds"); New York v. 
Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 711 (1987) (upholding warnL.'ltless inspection of an auto-
mobile scrap yard because a "statute informs the operator of a vehicle 
dismantling business that inspections will be made on a regular basis"); Dono-
van v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981) (upholding warrantless i;1.spection of 
coal mines under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act provided that the 
inspection program "provideD a constitutionally adequate substitute for a war-
rant0");Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987) ("[R]easonable police 
regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy 
the Fourth Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be 
able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure."). This 
limited relaxation of the warrant requirement in areas outside of day-to-day 
criminal investigation has been criticized as a form of privacy Lochnerism. 
See Stuntz, supra note 29, at 442; Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1047. 
256. Of course, one could also expand reasonableness to once again recog-
nize the role of the common law jury. See ArviAR, supra note 29, at 70. Doing 
so, however, would require the Supreme Court to re-examine its positions on 
sovereign immunity, official immunity, and habeas corpus. 
257. See supra Part II. 
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such searches at all. Allowing administrative rulemaking to 
replace the warrant requirement would suffer from the same 
fundamental problem of unbounded executive discretion pre-
Kyllo. A dialogue on reasonableness would simply replace the 
dialogue on privacy with law enforcement and the judiciary 
calling the shots. 
In contrast, requiring the use of surveillance technologies 
to be authorized by statute recognizes that the people should 
determine just how much power government should wield. As 
discussed earlier, popular control over govemment's power to 
search was the driving force behind the adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment. Moreover, requiring statutory authorization for 
law enforcement's power to search-even if it is not used to de-
termine reasonableness-would bring search and seizure law in 
line with the doctrine of separation of powers governing execu-
tive power in general. Outside the Fourth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court is highly skeptical of the executive branch de-
fining its own powers.258 Allowing law enforcement to deter-
mine what powers it may exercise in the absence of constitu-
tional or legislative authorization effectively grants the officer 
on the street or the chief of police greater power than the Chief 
Executive. 
In addition to being the proper constitutional body to de-
cide these questions, legislatures are institutionally more com-
petent than courts to make the types of policy decisions associ-
ated with authorizing government surveillance. Because they 
are politically accountable, they are more likely to evaluate the 
policy implications of certain surveillance technologies, balanc-
ing, among other things, the threat to privacy and potential for 
abuse against the needs of law enforcement and the interests of 
public safety considering the interest of the public in general. 
They are also better able to develop a factual record with re-
spect to the nuances and details of new technologies and their 
costs and benefits. Moreover, whatever one might think of the 
legislative process, it is more likely to take the interests of the 
general public into account in fashioning rules governing sur-
veillance than courts who are asked to make such decisions in 
cases in which a search revealed evidence of a defendant's guilt 
and the only remedy is exclusion of that evidence. 
Of course, allowing legislatures to determine government's 
258. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 
(1952). 
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power to search raises concerns about abuse or unresponsive 
legislative power. Admittedly, strict adherence to the warrant 
requirement avoids this problem by denying legislatures any 
power to deviate from the Warrant Clause.259 Concerns about 
legislative abuse, however, should be alleviated by judicial re-
view of these legislative determinations with the Warrant 
Clause as the guide. As the Supreme Court has done in the 
context of administrative searches, it should review statutory 
grants of power to determine whether the procedures adopted 
by legislatures are "constitutionally adequate substitute[s] for a 
warrant."260 Using the Warrant Clause as the touchstone for 
evaluating statutory safeguards would limit deViations from 
the amendment's stated safeguards while ensuring that the 
legislation limited arbitrary and abusive searches.261 Judicial 
review under these circUmstances would return the judiciary to 
its traditional constitutional role of evaluating such judgments 
against a· backdrop of constitutional principles and norms 
rather than allowing judges to sit a·s policym13.kers themselves. 
Ultimateiy, however, the majoritarian concern goes directly to 
the larger question of whether reasonableness under the 
Fourth Amendment should be expai1ded beyond the warrai1t 
requirement at all. 
Could Congress or a· state legislature satisfY the Fourth 
Amendment requirement ofreasonableness by simply passing a 
law autho.rizing law enforcement to adopt and use any technol-
ogy it chooses? Assuming that a legislature would pass such a 
statute, a highly dubious proposition, the answer must be no. 
While such a statute might satisfY the doctrine of separation of 
powers, it does nothing to address the concerns embodied in the 
1 • • • 
259. Of course, one may argue that the tyranny of contemporary majorities 
is simply replaced by the tyranny of past majorities. 
260. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603. 
261. Of cotirse, the legislation should be subject to review in light of other 
constitutional concerns including equal protection. As one author has noted, · 
Tht3 warrant requirement injects the judgment of a "neutral and de-
tach!;!d" ]]}agistrate and also has what may be the more important ef-
fect of compelling a contemporaneous recordation of the factors on 
whose basis the action is being taken: The probable cause require-
ment obviously can't guarantee a lack of. arbitrariness: invidious 
choices· among those respecting whom there is probable cause are pos-
sible. By setting a substantive parameter at one end of the decision, 
however, it at least requires that persons not be singled out for arrest 
or search in the absence of strong indication of guilt, that is, on the 
basis of constitutionally irrelevant factors alone. 
ELY, supra note 19, at 172-73. 
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Fourth Amendment. Such a statute does nothing to limit police 
discretion at either the macro or micro level. 262 While legisla-
tures may delegate broad discretionary powers to the executive 
branch in other areas of constitutional law, the Fourth 
Amendment would appear to limit such a delegation with re-
spect to searches and seizures. 
CONCLUSION 
The debate over the proper scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment in general, and its relationship with information gather-
ing technologies in particular, constitutes a debate over the 
proper distribution of power in our constitutional government. 
Who determines what technologies may be used to gather in-
formation about individuals and the public in general? In other 
words, who determines just how much security the people may 
enjoy? For more than a quarter of a century this decision was 
made occasionally by judges, but more often by law enforce-
ment engaged in the surveillance. Not only has this permitted 
technology to erode individual privacy, but it is contrary to the 
central purpose of the Fourth Amendment. In adopting the 
amendment, the Framers of our Constitution were primarily 
concerned with limiting government power and discretion, and 
like all governmental power, the decision of how much surveil-
lance power the government should have was left to the people. 
In debating over how to define privacy, the courts have ignored 
these concerns for far too long. . 
This Article has argued that the Fourth Amendment can-
not be viewed in isolation, but must be seen as a complement to 
other constitutional protections including the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers. The Fourth Amendment and the definition of 
executive power in our constitutional separation· of powers pro-
tect the public from arbitrary and unrestrained executive 
power. The need for this interpretation becomes clear when we 
recognize that certain decisions made by law enforcement are 
more than simply discretionary decisions about when to search 
a particular individual, but rather macro level decisions that 
determine the extent of their own powers and correspondingly 
the amount of privacy the public may enjoy. Accordingly, I 
262. This conclusion would also appear consistent with the colonial re-
sponse to the writs of assistance, which were condemned even though they 
were authorized by acts of parliament. See supra Part LA See generally 
SMITH, supra note 34 (discussing the colonial controversy surrounding the 
writs of assistance). 
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have argued that the Fourth Amendment requires that 
searches conducted with new surveillance technologies must be 
treated as searches subject to Fourth Amendment restraints. 
Teclmologically assisted searches must either comply with the 
Warrant Clause or be authorized by a statute containing safe-
guards that are constitutionally adequate substitutes for a 
warrant. While this Article has focused on law enforcement de-
cisions to adopt new surveillance technologies, the concerns it 
raises about existing Fourth Amendment law are not limited to 
technology. Law enforcement decisions to use undercover 
agents, helicopters, or automatic weapons in combating crime 
are all decisions that determine the scope of executive power 
and the level of privacy and security the public may enjoy. To 
the extent that the Supreme Court interprets the Fourth 
Amendment in such a way that it no longer serves as a check 
against arbitrary government decisionmaking in these areas as 
well, the constitutional questions are equally troubling. It may 
be expedient or more efficient to leave certain decisions to the 
executive branch rather than subject them to the limits im-
posed by the Constitution or to :require legislative authorization 
and safegu.arding, especially in times of crises. Our Constitu-
tion, however, was not adopted to promote efficiency but to pre-
serve liberty, and there is no mo:re important means ofpreserv-
ing individual liberty than prohibiting the exercise of arbitrary 
power. While these institutions and principles may be destined 
to pass away, "it is the duty of the Court to be [the] last, not 
[the] first to give them up."263 
263. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
